121 However, the political climate of Egypt at the time of my research made such a study impracticable. In reorienting my research, I decided to confine my study to al-Qasr and an analysis of "micropolitics" at the local community level.

The aim of the present study is, then, an understanding of the political structure of al-Qasr. Also, since no group exists in isolation and relations with others are mainly a matter of politics, I have tried to present here the structural and ideological bases of politics in al-Qasr. This study is concerned with politics in the traditional sense and in the modern sense. An analysis of the traditional meaning of politics necessitates a discussion and understanding of the structural principles of Bedouin society and the manner in which they function in defining the rights and obligations contained in social relationships. Such an analysis also seeks to establish a base level from which we can perceive and understand the political process in al-Qasr and the modern context of Bedouin politics. The main focus of the political analysis in this study is upon authority and leadership roles, as they were in the past and as they are in the present.

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*613 I should hasten to make one thing clear at this time, for it directly affected the way I went about my research and the type of data which I collected. In al-Qasr, there exists communication boundaries, and even barriers, corresponding to the structural and territorial lines of the lineage system.

•[178] The 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr, once a nomadic tribe, is now

121 sedentary, but the semi-autonomous nature of the lineage segments
114 is maintained to a large extent. The result of this is a de-
*613 emphasis of the "we-feeling" among the population of al-Qasr
•[178] and an absence of "sense of community" (Easton 1965:332). By
[186] "community," I refer to a pattern of relatively intensive,
[571] face-to-face social relationships, and the values of solidarity
and common goals to which these give rise. The relationship
121 between lineage structure and territoriality was such that
*613 kinship segments within the same lineage unit might go days,
571 and even weeks, with no inter-communication, and the degree of communication between separate lineage units of the tribe was less intensive than this. Such a communication pattern made observation difficult. The fact that Bedouin tribal society relatively lacks the group ceremonial aspect compounded the difficulty of gaining an overall perspective of structural relations, and of witnessing the bases and nature of social interaction outside the lineage structure. All of this emerges from a communication structure and kinship structure differentiated into corporate groups which "discourage close participation of members in the social relations of the larger society" (Wolf 1957:7).

121 The structural arrangement of al-Qasr was such that, in plain language, not a great deal was happening in the sociological sense. I say this about al-Qasr in comparison
[123] with, for instance, a full-blown village community. Consequently, I observed from day to day that which I could,

175 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British
648 reached Matruh, they jailed all of the 'umdas and shaikhs
554 (two 'umdas and five shaikhs, at that time). Then they chose
631 new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British, they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail, they returned to their positions of political office. While they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the
•[178] British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western
648 Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of 1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940, that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did
175 they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the
648 people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya
722 near Alexandria for the duration of the war.
166
[556] Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

History of Settlement in al-Qasr

173 The settlement of al-Qasr took place about 200 years
[166] ago when the Awlad 'Ali first came to the area from Cyrenaica.
[175] No historical documentation for this period exists. The
173 various versions which the Bedouins offer are both vague and
*613 ethnocentric with reference to lineage. A point of consensus
[712] is that the zone was first claimed by Abu Mahjuba who built a large fort (qasr = "fort" or "castle") near the coast. The Bedouins say that Abu Mahjuba settled in the area of al-Qasr because "he knew good land when he saw it." He belonged to no one lineage, "he was 'Aishaibi only." All of the lineages of al-Qasr claim that their ancestors came with Abu Mahjuba and settled on the land at that time. Abu Mahjuba has been mythologized: he belongs to all of al-Qasr, a symbol of local group solidarity and fraternal equality.

173 Al-Qasr represents the end of nomadic life for the
361 'Aishaibat tribe. According to the Bedouins, each tribe and
•[198] lineage took that part of al-Qasr which it preferred. If the members of the segment wanted to grow vegetables, they took land on the coast; if they preferred the "old way of life," they set up their tents in the sha'ir wi mar'a area and raised sheep. "Everything was fine," they say, "there were no land registration laws--a man was free." Al-Qasr was settled
[619] "after the wars" (with the Hanadi), and it was only then that the Awlad 'Ali broke up into tribes. The 'Aishaibat took the

173 land along the coast: "This land was free, and the man who
[36] planted on it owned it. We call this (method of claiming land)
[425] wad'a-l-id ("laying on of the hand," i.e. seizure). There was
[423] plenty of freedom in those days. A man could farm or keep animals." Planting and caring for the land is not novel to the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

423 The Bedouins claim that the pattern of land distribution
425 established during the time of Abu Mahjuba prevails today.
656 Further, they say that these rules will never change, no matter
• [178] what laws come out of Cairo: "Land registration can mean nothing where the tribes are concerned, for no Bedouin would be willing to take the land of another Bedouin. The government forces us to register our land so that it can be stated in the newspaper that they are giving the Bedouins land."

*613 The relationship between ecology and lineage territory
423 is not striking, such as in the case of the Cyrenaican Bedouins
182 of Libya (Peters 1960). In most cases, lineage territories run on a north-south line cross-cutting the coastal garden and southern pastoral zones. Hence, lineage territories are, generally, ecologically similar rather than contrasted. However,
*613 there are exceptions. 'Ailit Shraif lineage (see Figure 3a
423 below), at the western end of al-Qasr's 'izba sector, settled
182 there "because of the abundance of underground water in this
241 area: the ground is rocky here and the water comes out fresh
[312] like the Nile." Their founder, Sayyid Shraif, "specialized"
[361]

*613 423 182 241 [312] in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and vegetables." To the southeast of the 'izba, the lineages of Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It *613 182 184 241 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture. [231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own sheep.

656 423 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert. The government attempted it a number of times, but with little success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization (GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the 361 342 •178 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the 361 648 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town. Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

361 1925 and 1930 because, as they point out, the British
648 administration provided employment for "the poor Bedouin."
361 The wealthier Bedouins who owned camels and large numbers of
556 sheep remained in the desert. Just the reverse is happening
•178 at the present time. The rich men who see the advantages in business, and the comforts which Matruh offers, can also afford the change of residence or the maintenance of two residences.

175 In 1922, the Egyptian government first registered land
423 in al-Qasr. At this time, they sanctioned the tribal division
657 of territory which existed. There was no attempt to force political integration upon the Bedouins. Egypt has never had a nomad problem as have other Middle Eastern countries. The history of Egypt is essentially the history of the Nile Valley. Consequently, it is not odd that we find no mention of the Awlad 'Ali in the historical record. The Bedouins of the Western Desert were resigned to their place in the desert, and the central government saw no particular advantage or disadvantage in this.

423 Concern for the Bedouin minority in Egypt emerged only
648 with nationalistic programs of modernization. In 1954, the Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East convened in Baghdad. From this meeting came some general recommendations for dealing with the problems of the Bedouin. The major proposal was calculated to transform

657 sanctioned the direction of economic development from a
177 pastoral to a market-oriented, agricultural mode of production.
474 Land reclamation and development projects administered by the
433 cooperatives encourage the Bedouins to produce cash crops.
In this way, Al-Qasr is being drawn into the national economy.
Price changes and seasonal commodity preferences in the Nile
Valley now affect the economy of al-Qasr. The generation of a
[181] cash economy has created a competitive spirit and a degree of
individual independence which cuts across tribal loyalty and
affiliations. The cooperative society, in this manner, tends
to be a "social equalizer."

657 But economic transformation as the intended goal of the
177 Cooperative Law is far from being an accomplished fact. Al-
•178 Qasr is still a traditional Bedouin society in the sense that
474 the lineage structure is the framework in which economic and
*613 social relations take place. Because the cooperative society,
as a new basis for association, threatens the dominance of the
lineage principle, it has become the focal point for a struggle
between the old and new.

657 The major problem encountered by the government officials
177 in this program is that the cooperative society, as a central
474 agent for the dispensation of aid products, becomes a pawn in
661 tribal power politics. The government, forced to rely upon the
435 prestigious and wealthy men for the initiation of an innovative
program, found itself unable to prevent profiteering and the

747 the basis of conflict. Bedouins may be unwilling to contract
177 such a potentially significant relationship for the 50 piasters
474 it takes to join the cooperative society. In yet another area,
426 program administrators concerned with nutritional improvement
571 have ignored the culturally important areas of food preferences
747 and, more seriously, food prohibitions. The Bedouins, who
177 subsist mainly on their own animal products, barley bread, and
262 a few fresh vegetables, are extremely hesitant to accept what they consider ritually "unclean meat from foreigners," powdered milk, dried fish, and Kraft cheese. They are willing to
747 accept grain, flour, and the cottonseed cakes which are used
177 as fodder. In other words, the Bedouins seem to be presented
• [178] with poor alternatives which may tend to reinforce choices
[433] related to the traditional productive organization, i.e., pastoralism. The exogenous stimuli to change are so culturally objectionable that they actually generate conflict situations and misunderstanding between agents and recipients of change.

747 Government programs have aimed at one aspect of
177 Bedouin society, the economic structure. They have ignored
433 the cultural underpinning of social organization, the system of meanings in terms of which social action takes place (Geertz 1957:32-54). The relationship between social and economic behavior is, of course, an extremely important one. But the economic structure cannot be transformed independently of a specific cultural structure.

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The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastoralist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and complex market operations. They understand the logic and operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

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The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased while pastoralist activities became less important. In the past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;" even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

433 plant a small crop or graze their animals on the land of
197 relatives. In terms of economic specialty, the economy of
198 al-Qasr has for some time been a mixed one. Traditionally,
433 dependence was upon animal products with relatively few
197 vegetables being grown in the 'izba sector of the coast and
198 the barley sector to the south. Now, over one-half of the
241 registered land in al-Qasr is aboricultural land, and much
311 more land is given over to the growing of vegetables than in the past. Correspondingly, the barley land has decreased. The Bedouins still use barley primarily for fodder but much of this comes from the government. With the shift to olive arboriculture and government aid in the form of flour and grain, naturally the barley crop has become less crucial. But it remains indispensable for many Bedouins during this transitional period. All Bedouins of al-Qasr are concerned with securing a good livlihood. They express this idea in the term ma'isha simha, and, as I have noted, they identify it with the garden coastal sector of al-Qasr. The security of a cash economy and participation in the national economy
433 have been realized by the Bedouins. I have no figures on the
241 amount of land registered prior to 1960, but, as of 1964,
311 al-Qasr consisted of 2,000 registered acres. Over one-half
434 of this land is in the garden area of al-Qasr, and is planted with orchards. All of this land represents cash crops. Planted in between the orchards are vegetable gardens. These gardens

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the 'izba sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

233 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
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[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he
[497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head. But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few
[554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can
492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his
[462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford
[407] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

423 society. Private ownership of land with sovereign rights
* [613] over it is now the normal practice in al-Qasr. Rights are
• [178] held by the family head, the shaib. If the family head is
[596] deceased, land tenure rights are held jointly by the sons.

In the area beyond the plateau, in the extreme
[184] south of al-Qasr, land rights to grazing and water still are
* [613] associated with lineages. But here agriculture is impossible.
[241] The type of rights over the land varies with the method by which it is exploited. The southern and coastal sections of
[433] al-Qasr represent the old and the new, the pastoral traditional mode of production and the modern agricultural cash economy.
[233] But, as noted, of the total population only a few Bedouins are actually engaged in pastoralist activities. Hence, tribal tenure rights, in general, are not overly important at this time. Not too long ago they were, and many cases in the recent
[671] history of Bedouin customary law relate to conflicts over land and water in the southern region. The Bedouins say that
[178] traditionally no lineage could use the pasturage or water of
* [613] another without some agreement, usually of long standing,
[233] made beforehand. Now, they say, permission is not needed.
[675] In the old days, these agreements were made between lineage representatives, not individuals per se. Today, the grass
178 and water in the southern zone are claimed, though not in a
423 legal sense, by the families using them: the rights of usufruct over the land are closer to rights of sovereignty

178 than they were in the past. These conditions reflect a change
423 in social and authority relations.

423 In the 'izba sector of al-Qasr, as of 1964, there were
432 two cases of land purchase. In one case, land was sold to an Egyptian, "an outsider" from the Nile Valley. This, of course, could only occur where such a transaction would be upheld by
423 the Egyptian government. Land ownership, when it involves registered land, is absolute. This, to a great extent, works
*[613] to lessen the influence of the lineage structure on property
423 relations. The law governing property, whether in traditional
178 or modern al-Qasr, reflects a set of social relationships.
571 When an individual can own property in the absolute sense, rather than with respect to his being a member of a group which enjoys sovereign rights of ownership, then, there has been a change in traditional corporate relations (Herskovits
[184] 1952:260). This has definitely been the case for most of al-Qasr, and it is adumbrated in the southern sector where a person's rights over land are nearly absolute. A compar-
423 ison of land tenure patterns on the coast and in the southern
184 region reflect not only the contrast between methods of land use, but, also the fact that as land becomes valuable it becomes scarce and land holdings become fragmented (compare Figures 5 and 6).

428 When the head of a household dies, his eldest son
596 inherits his authority, but all of the sons share equally in

428 inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent,
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[422] which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the
177 level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the
*178 composition of the basic family structure. One informant,
[124] who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a household composed of his grandfather, father, father's brothers and their families. Since that time, his father has built another house away from the family home; one uncle has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home; and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original house. This fission-type process is not uncommon in a segmentary society, although as a traditional process, it represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures. In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual profits.

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*613 office in modern Bedouin society. Also, we will return to
•178 the processes of fission and fusion when we discuss Bedouin
598 law. I will be able to show through the use of legal documents
[194] how one tertiary unit went through a process of fission, fusion and re-fusion with its secondary unit.

The capacity for fusion and fission is a result of a number of structural situations. First of all, it is the exercise of choice on the part of the tertiary segment members who have contracted alliance in the form of collective responsibility with other tertiary segments of the lineage. The choice to break off from the major group may be of two kinds: a severence of political ties with one group in favor of a new group or the natural process of segmentation as a response to ecological conditions. In the latter case, no new political alliances are formed, and it usually involves a married son going off to begin his own camp. It is only an expansion of the major or secondary group. But the former case is one of decimation: the secondary group contracts. In both cases, authority is exercised, either between father and son, or,
*613 between heads of corporate groups. In al-Qasr, the capacity
598 for either type of fission is limited by the political en-
179 vironment of the Egyptian nation-state, the highest level
178 of authority which the Bedouin encounters. The classic functioning of the segmentary lineage system is, in the case of al-Qasr, being changed by extra-system factors. The

*613 Bedouins, always a minority in Egypt, have been undergoing
•178 a transition to peasantry since about 1800. Probably since
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578 that time, Bedouin society has been, to use Easton's (1959) emphasis, a "segmentary society" rather than a "segmenting society."

196 Formal Bedouin categories of kinship are confusing; depending upon the situation they use the concepts of bait, 'ait, 'aiela and qabiila interchangeably. The term bait literally means "house," the term bait al-'Arab may mean "the tent" or "the people of the tent." "People of the tent" [594] may refer to either the nuclear family of one man, or the nuclear families of a man, his brothers and his sons, and [596] their spouses and offspring. In the latter case, the ex-[621] tended family is referred to as the naja'. A naja', or camp, usually consists of three or four tents. The word bait may 196 refer to the tertiary and the sub-tertiary groups, and oc-*613 casionally one might even refer to the secondary group as a bait when he wishes to emphasize the quality of corporateness. The term 'aiela, literally "family," is the word used most often to designate the secondary lineage segment. The diminutive of this word, i.e. 'ait, usually refers to the sub-tertiary group but it commonly designates the secondary group [619] also. The term qabiila, "tribe," is the only word used for the primary and supra-primary lineage groupings. These are 196 the general Bedouin usages and their frequency will vary not

593 In al-Qasr it is a rare sight to see a father and his young son together, and it is only slightly more common to see the father with the grown son. The second case may simply be a reflection of the division of labor since the son, once grown, takes over the economic tasks of his father.

593 869 584 872 The most important duties of a father toward his son are three: he must teach him generosity, courage and courtesy; he must see that the boy learns the Quran; and he must arrange a good marriage for his son. According to 593 852 [872] [583] Peters (1960:34), the Cyrenaican Bedouin father must attend to three things for his son, namely: his circumcision, his education in the Quran, and his bridewealth when he marries. [177] In al-Qasr, the Egyptian school teachers have succeeded in showing the Bedouin that circumcision is a private family 593 852 •178 affair and not a public ritual. Although all fathers still see to it that their sons are circumcised, the father is no longer responsible for "making a circumcision party." In [626] [431] fact, the father who does insist on following the old ways by hiring a dancer and publicly marking his son's rite de passage, will be ridiculed as one "who only wants to make money from the ritual gift (naquut) given the boy."

593 The son recognizes the rights which the father has over him through a show of respect and obedience. A boy shows deference toward his father by not smoking, singing, or reciting poetry of any kind in his presence. During the

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• 178 Only one of the three weddings was conducted in the traditional way with three nights of dancing previous to the wedding and a large feast on the wedding day. The Bedouin say that a man can no longer afford to do things the old way.

584 The procedure of the marriage arrangement begins when the boy informs his uncle that he wishes to marry. Then the uncle,

[583] the father and other males of the group meet with the father of the prospective bride to arrange the marriage, an important part of which is the establishment of the brideprice (hulwaan or mahr). Before going to see the girl's father, the boy's

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*613 father consults with his secondary lineage group, as I have already mentioned. Then he should wait for a period of seven days, for the girl's father, "who has heard about the marriage," must consult with his group and wait for a period of one week during which time any member of the girl's

584 lineage may claim her. After this time, the ties proposed

[695] by the marriage are ritualized by two preliminary acts: the writing of the contract (ma'azuum) between the fathers, and the offering of a lamb by the groom which solemnizes his intentions and the marriage (dabah fi-l-williyya). After

[43] another waiting period of about two weeks, during which time the boy buys gifts of clothing and jewelry and presents them to the girl at her home, the wedding celebration begins.

585 On the day of the wedding, the girl is delivered to the groom's residence. The girl remains in the groom's tent, or

*613 682 435 436 •178 [571] Each member of the corporate group contributes an equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case. The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels. If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in [231] the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing unimportance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there [556] is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least 1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

*613 682 554 591 When it has been decided that the right of blood-revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the 'aqila must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-money. Each 'aqila of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The 'aqila must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the 'aqila "should be rich." Though the 'awaagil of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the 'aqila of Bait Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an 'aqila: "The 'aqila is responsible for his bait.

*613 682 554 57 He must pay the diiya with the shares which he collects from the others. It makes no difference if the 'aqila must pay with his own money. He is responsible for this matter before the whole tribe."

*613 554 682 [692] The collection of the diiya is only one aspect of the process of conflict regulation, but it stands out as the fundamental manifestation of the office of 'aqila. In the course of office, an 'aqila will spend much more time arbitrating disputes, but it is his responsibility concerning blood-money which defines his position and his jurisdiction as corporate ones. During the present period in al-Qasr, the practice of blood-revenge has all but disappeared as a mechanism of social control. Nevertheless, the possibility of its happening is not too remote. The payment of blood-money is the alternative to blood-revenge, and blood-revenge is a condition for all-out tribal warfare--something which the Bedouins look upon with horror. One informant once likened a primary-level war between the 'Aishaibat and the Kamailat (should it ever occur) to "the end of the world." The 'aqila as a representative of a group can prevent war by preventing reciprocal homicides: by presenting his share of the blood-money he regulates conflict and promotes integration. The blood-money is usually paid over a period of from one to two years. In this case, the notion of "debt" represents a contingent, institutionalized social relationship for the purpose of maintaining political order.

682 178 [626] [619] [721] [829] *613 682 554 578 [571]

*613 554 578 692 Conflict regulation, in the formal sense, is the province of the 'aqila. All complaints should be taken before the 'aqila. In al-Qasr, every individual has certain rights, and when any of these rights are infringed upon he may demand a redress of wrongs: he demands his rights, or exercises haqq al-'Arab ("the right of the Arabs"). The haqq al-'Arab is opposed to the haqq Allah, "the right of God," which concerns crimes against religion (i.e., wine-drinking, apostasy). The dichotamy represents private claims over against the claims of a religious state which is characteristic of Islamic society. [688] In al-Qasr, crimes against religion have never occurred, and if they did they would be handled in Marsa Matruh by the local shaikh ("holy man").

*613 554 69 The litigation process is initiated when an individual appears before his 'aqila with a claim, and the statement: "I do not wish so-and-so to take any of my rights." The 'aqila first attempts to persuade each party "to return to the path of the good," to come together and to cease quarreling. This type of moral persuasion is preliminary to a full court-hearing in which both parties will appear with witnesses before their respective 'awaaqil, and other "third parties" who aid the 'awaaqil in their decision. The decision reached by the court is morally binding upon both parties. According to recent [671] innovation in Bedouin customary law, the details of the liti- •[178] gation and the decision reached by the court are to be recorded

*613 554 69 [671] [178] on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector. In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court case in his files).

*613 695 692 [671] As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of appeals may even function at the level of familial authority, i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal a decision of his own 'aqila, he will generally take his claim to another 'aqila of his secondary group. When an appeal is to be made, it is done with the permission of the 'aqila who rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case does so with the understanding that the decision returned by the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if [681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original fine), and also pays his own 'aqila an expiation fee (kubaara).

69 648 [682] [685] The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

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jural status in the lineage by contributing its share of the blood-money.

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The consolidation of tertiary groups into authority groups may shed some light on the dual process of fission and fusion common in segmentary societies. The structure of authority groups which make up a secondary group is a reflection of the way in which tertiary segments grow and segment, or decline and fuse, into other groups. In the process, one group, or many small groups of agnates, are incorporated under a name other than that of their genealogical ancestor. Through time, and in the interest of group solidarity and political order, real biological ties may be obscured: the regulation of political relations favors ideological jural ties over genealogical ties which indicate lineal differences. With reference to 'Ailit Ma'fas, perhaps in the future, Bait Yunis, with only three members, will be totally submerged into the authority group, Bait Muhammad, so that the individual, Yunis, will be dropped from the genealogy of 'Ailit Ma'fas. Then the descendents of Yunis will be linked to Muhammad, the founder of Bait Muhammad, by an artificial link, though the patrilineal ideology will define it as a descent link. During the period of solidification, there is apt to be confusion concerning the exact nature of kinship ties. For instance, in al-Qasr, there was a great deal of argument about whether or not 'Ailit Ma'fas was once a segment of 'Ailit Lazumi. As I

*613 571 •178 have noted previously, informants very definitely disagreed over the matter; by looking at the two genealogies one is unable to say one way or the other. The process of fission and fusion in the form of secession and adoption is another instance of genealogical manipulation through patrilineal ideology. In this case, patrilineal ideology also may succeed in concealing real biological links in favor of political relations. We shall see below how secession and adoption actually function in Bedouin society.

*613 675 554 571 We have said that the authority of the 'aqila is legitimate at each structural level. The Bedouins of al-Qasr often legitimate the authority of the 'aqila in writing, and, at the same time, make an explicit statement of social compact which outlines the pragmatic and moral values of the corporate group. The corporate charter in al-Qasr is a document of self-interest which defines expectations and consequences for corporate members: it governs the conduct of members in situations relevant to internal order, and gives the 'aqila powers of representation in external affairs. The charter is a [181] reflection of the high value the Bedouins place upon security and order, and is a condition for a legal system of wider *613 675 571 scope. Max Weber (1947:120) has expressed the idea of social relationship as contract so well that it is worthwhile to quote him extensively here.

*613 173 That the secondary segment is as significant as the tertiary group seems to be indicated by the Bedouin tendency to mythologize the founder of the secondary group. For instance, Ma'fas is a nickname literally meaning "the big-footed one;" the Zagharat take their name from a man who used the zaghaariid ("shrill cry of joy" used by women) as his battle-cry; Abu Qarasa means "father of bread-loaf;" Sayyid Shraif was a very "noble" (shraif - "high-bred, noble") man. Along with each name there are a number of different myths to explain it: hence Ma'fas was a cattle thief who left large footprints in the mud so that all would know of his daring exploits; Abu Qarasa baked hugh loaves of bread to honor his in-laws when they visited him. On the other hand, there are no myths about

*613 178 founders of tertiary segments. Tertiary segments might, in the future, disappear from the Bedouins' genealogy, either because of death, barawwa, or secession, but the secondary group survives these events. It is the secondary segment, as we shall see in our discussion of law and sanctions, which is structurally important for the political community of the Awlad 'Ali.

*613 571 Because the secondary level is the more structurally important, seeing that the greater benefits of collective responsibility derive from it, the tertiary group surrenders part of its autonomy to it. The tertiary group does so in just the way that the individual member of any polity allows

*613 778 182 682 The nazaala as a regulatory mechanism functions only between secondary segments. This indicates that blood-revenge as a negative sanction is operative only in the external system of political relations. Political relations at this level, where the feeling of corporateness is relatively lacking, are in delicate balance. Therefore, once conflict is successfully mediated and the injury redressed, it is best forgotten, for it is unlikely that either party feels their rights have been completely restored.

683 Sanctions against personal injury, besides killing, are dealt out in terms of fines, the fines being figured as proportions of the diiya. Every part of the body has a price on it: the Bedouins say, "Banu Adam kill-i-filuus" ("The sons of Adam are all money"). A proportion of the diiya is due for injury to any of the following parts of the body: the beard, hair on the head and the nape of the neck, and eyelashes; wounds to any part of the body; fractures and dislocations of bones; the tongue and the teeth; the testicles and the breasts; and the loss of mind. Bodily injuries are [463] evaluated by a considered expert, the nathaara ("the keen-[305] eyed one"). If the services of a nathaara become necessary in al-Qasr, the barber in Marsa Matruh (the same person who performs most of the Bedouins' circumcisions) fills the role. [178] But the Bedouins say, "Now that we are educated we are able to make our own evaluations."

554 571 182 561 [154] seen" at any such function. It would appear that the mechanism at work here is not simply a device to provide the younger generation with a tension-release situation, but also a symbolic expression of the difference between the possessors and the non-possessors of authority, a confirmation of the political order.

[598] The avoidance practice, or separation, between the old and the young in the "party" situation is a structural fact of Bedouin society, and, though it may ultimately be defined as a conflict control or legitimating mechanism, in the context of culture change new aspects and meanings attach

554 571 178 [471] [439] [177] to the phenomenon. The "status group" is an agent of change in al-Qasr; its members can afford to gamble in the market economy of Marsa Matruh since they possess the reserve capital (in the form of sheep) and the social prestige which permits this. The "status group," with business and social relations in Marsa Matruh, enjoys both the benefits of associational ties with the Egyptians and the communal ties with their fellow Bedouins. They see themselves as being different from their fellow tribesmen, and they tend to face more towards Marsa Matruh than al-Qasr. In short, they are the "cultural brokers" who support an ideology of change, they extol the benefits of a new way of life over and against the old.

[789] [796] One repudiation of tradition which constitutes an attempt to define the style of life of the "status group"

554 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor
571 of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the darwish
• 178 performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron
789 to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his
796 two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these affairs because the darwish and his magic "belong totally to the old way of life." This is a restriction on social intercourse. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to
554 share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in
571 al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and
183 patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But the result is a "status group" mood which may be described as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of the "status group."

554 The pool from which the members of the "status group"
556 are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of
571 three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been,
* [613] traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

554 turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal
571 problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins
627 place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system
182 of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth
[181] of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from
[556] non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica: generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-
682 revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills
627 intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the
*613 murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela.
829 But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said: "The best man should be killed for this is right in the Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man who is the 'aqila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

> Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms with your family, then he will be the first one to be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a rajal khair because he may do good in the future.
> •[178] In the old days, the killing started right away, and all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--people are improving.

554 The rajal khair, then, is a broker in social relation-
571 ships, a manipulator of loyalties. As a member of the "status
627 group," he can afford to spend time and money in courting his fellow tribesmen, and, as a result, can accrue prestige and loyalty. This role, like that of the 'aqila, is a secular
[681] one. The sanctions which it controls are as economical as those of the 'aqila's are political. In this sense, they are differentiated from the role of rajal saalih whose sanctions are sacred in nature.

554 The traditional role which we define as that of the
792 rajal saalih, "the holy man," was probably much more important
[178] in the past than it is today. In al-Qasr, there are only two rajal saalih who share in traditional power: the one is a resident of al-Qasr proper, and the other, a member of the prestigious Sanusi family, lives near Marsa Matruh.

The rajal saalih of al-Qasr, i.e. the local "holy man," is assured of status because he is an ashraf, one who claims descent from the family of the Prophet. He is also a
[561] member of the elder age-set, and while he is not rich, he cannot be considered poor. Though the "holy man" al-Sanusi
[793] lives near Matruh, he participates in the authority structure of al-Qasr and is a member of the "status group." He is sometimes referred to as rajal saalih kabir, "a great holy man," by virtue of his Sanusi heritage.

[771] The relative unimportance of this role as compared to that of the rajal khair in conflict regulation is a function

554 It is interesting to note that Hajj 'Ali is one of the most
[571] powerful members of the "status group" in al-Qasr. He is
• [178] also a leading proponent of social change and a critic of
the old way of life which includes belief in magic. One can
[792] see how 'Amm Salih's influence and status might work in other
areas of social action.

554 Although it is conceivable that a rajal salih can
792 be asked to intervene in any type of conflict, it is more
627 likely that he will preside at cases involving marriage and
[695] divorce. The rajal saalih may also be asked to serve as a
[691] witness or consultant in litigation cases. The Bedouins
* [613] point out that the "holy man," like the rajal khair, is apt
[829] to be more trustworthy than the formal authority, the 'aqila.

> Sanusi is a good man and the people should listen to him. He is a rajal khair, a rajal saalih, not an 'aqila. He is better than an 'aqila--he is our brother. He is much better than the 'umda because he never changes the truth. The 'umda may go and accuse me wrongly to the government but Sanusi would never do this.

554 It is, of course, difficult to decide whether Sanusi's
792 charisma stems from the fact that he is a rajal salih, or the
facts of his wealth and family. Most probably it is a little
of both, the sacred as well as the secular. 'Amm Salih, on
the other hand, is neither wealthy nor from a particularly
prestigious family by economic standards of al-Qasr: he
derives his influence and status from the sacred aspects of

554 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the
121 political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

> In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary . . . there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise--that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage societies).

554 Foci of power and authority change and at times
178 irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the
792 rajal saalih was more influential during the days of the
571 Sanusiiya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy
[795] men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations through the zawiya system: they were in a position to command respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group" in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now. People in the old days were not educated as they are today: the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. In the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask

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554 you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to
178 him. God was pleased with them at that time."
[792]

This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization
128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

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The roles of 'umda and shaikh were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

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Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an 'umda and a shaikh who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence
[571] resides with them. With reference to the two authority
[635] structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the 'umda and the

634 to the 'umda. Both offices are for a life-term, only being
554 terminated by bad behavior or senility. At the expiration
634 of an incumbent's term, the "status group" meets in al-Qasr
571 to decide upon his replacement. The name of a "nominee"
635 is passed on to the Governor who is expected to approve the
666 Bedouins' selection of a representative to the government.
• [178] It is this "status group"-controlled process which the
[177] Governor seeks to change. Since these are officially held offices in the U.A.R. governmental structure, he feels that elections to fill their vacancies should be a public affair. Naturally, he will exercise more influence over the naming of candidates in this way, and the Bedouins perceive this as a challenge to the traditional structure of leadership and control of external relations.

634 The offices of 'umda and shaikh are even more heredi-
*613 tary than that of 'aqila, which theoretically should not be
666 the case. By definition, the role of 'aqila is functional at
[428] the bait level, and so the recruitment pool of candidates for this office is inherently limited. By comparison, the offices of 'umda and shaikh should go to the "best men" in the tribe, and, therefore, the recruitment pool should be
634 tribal-wide. But, in fact, these two offices are considered
*613 "the property" of the wealthiest lineages in the al-Qasr area.
666 There is a traditional rationale behind this fact: there is
428 the structural necessity for, and conscious practice of, an
[571]

634 no coincidence, then, that the present 'umda and shaikh are
*613 the sons of the former 'umda and shaikh. This reveals not
666 only the structural rules of succession, but also indicates
428 that "social honor," and thus power, still resides with these
[578] families.

It is important to note that since the time of their
• [178] inception, these roles have not changed 'aiela or even bait
in al-Qasr. When the former 'umda from 'Ailit Lazumi died,
634 his eldest son petitioned to the 'awaaqil of the 'Aishaibat
*613 that he be approved to succeed to his father's position.
666 The 'awaaqil met and made their decision. One 'aqila who
428 was present at the election said: "The office of 'umda should
571 stay in the Lazumi family since the father was 'umda. The
'awaaqil agreed on the son. But the son will be accepted to
follow his father only if he is good. If he is not good, the
'awaaqil will find a new bait." Although the Bedouins speak
of "the 'awaaqil" electing the 'umda, it must be remembered
that it is the "status group" which makes the decision, and
that the 'awaaqil are only part of this group. The names of
[627] the men who elected the present 'umda include less 'awaaqil
and more rajal khair.

114 Before I arrived in the field, the present acting
634 'umda of the 'Aishaibat tribe was elected to the national
666 parliament to represent the province of Marsa Matruh. The
election of his replacement was not scheduled to take place

124 If the office left the family,
*613 all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The
634 job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible,
571 then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the
666 'awaaqil will decide.
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A change in the present locus of legal authority in
634 the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship
•178 would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to
121 serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a clear explanation and new statement of social reality since it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate distribution of power and political order.

634 The office of the shaikh is not a potential power-
554 base by comparison with the office of 'umda. The shaikh, rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the 'umda. As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the shaikh's office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the shaikh remains in the shadow of the 'umda. He never substitutes for the 'umda, for this would infringe on the rightful power of the 'umda's family; when the 'umda is absent,

634 554 of little significance in the authority structure. Very few people of the al-Qasr area have had any contact with these officers, and very few want any contact. On the other hand, 634 554 the direction of change in al-Qasr and the bureaucratic growth • 178 of the government in the Western Desert makes it likely that all Bedouins will be drawn into the total authority structure, and that the roles of 'umda and shaikh will expand. These roles will not increase in terms of traditional prestige and status, but they may gain the authority which they do not possess now. This is in view of the fact that the traditional authority structure remains relatively intact. The 'umda and the shaikh have no traditional basis of authority, so they cannot make decisions which are morally binding for Bedouins of al-Qasr at this time. It is obvious, of course, that the 'umda 634 635 may refer to the Governor, and even the use of governmental 554 force, as the basis of his legitimacy. But this has never 178 happened. The incumbent 'umda is still a Bedouin, and this prevents him from challenging the traditional ways. Also, the Governor is concerned with restricting the 'umda's influence not increasing it.

634 I do not mean to imply that there is, or will be, a 613 struggle for power between traditional authority represented 178 by the 'aqila and modern legal authority represented by the 578 'umda. Such a struggle could not actually occur since when, and if, the 'umda came to represent authority in a newly

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structured situation the traditional authority structure would have disappeared from the scene.

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But, there is a struggle for authority recognition going on in al-Qasr. It is related to the change from the old basis of traditional authority to a new basis of legal authority. At the heart of this struggle is the role of the rajal khair. The rajal khair has a firm public basis for establishing himself in an authoritative and representative role. Traditionally, the rajal khair has faced inward and outward: he has used his ascribed position on the al-Qasr prestige scale to augment his status and influence, and, at the same time, his economic rationality has oriented him toward Marsa Matruh. In the present stage of culture change, the rajal khair is in a position to combine his ascribed and achieved attributes to gain entrance to a new reference group, the Egyptian bureaucracy. This offers him a new kind of prestige as well as affording him new opportunities for power, and even authority, over his fellow Bedouins.

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The rajal khair, in view of his movement between the old and new in Egypt, maintains a tertium quid status in two camps. While he has one foot in the traditional community because of his role in conflict regulation and the manipulation of traditional values, the rajal khair also has a foot in the

178 554 627 modern camp. He has been able to enter into dialogue with modernizing agents because his intra-tribal "status honor" renders him public recognition at the institutional level, and because his worldly style of life allows him to, in part, identify with a modern reference group.

554 178 634 *613 The 'aqila and the 'umda might be seen as the two extremes of a temporary and emerging authority structure for the Bedouin of al-Qasr: the traditional authority bound to the old moral order, and the modern legal authority identified wholly with an, as of yet, outside political and moral order.

[627] Ideally, it seems that only the rajal khair, who is neither an 'aqila nor an 'umda, is in the structural and ideological position to assume leadership and to guide the Bedouins during this period of culture change.

121 554 627 557 structural principle of bureaucracy, the rajal khair lacking legitimacy in the traditional lineage-based system may envisage an authoritative role and increased chances to "improve his status through the judicious manipulation of social ties."

121 554 178 Leadership studies in the context of cultural change, such as those which deal with "broker" types, have important implications for a more general and fundamental theoretical problem: the role of the individual in culture and society. Radin, as early as 1927, Redfield (1960), Geertz (1960), Fallers (1964), and Mead (1964) have spoken of "primitive philosophers," "the hinge group," "the cultural brokers," "the new men," and "the evolutionary clusters." All terms have direct reference to role types constructed from the observation of individuals possessed of the ability and creativity to offer new ideas and methods of dealing with the pressing cultural problems of their times. The unitary goal of all these researchers was to understand culture change through a focus on the way in which the individual manipulates his cultural resources.

121 I would maintain that, especially in political analysis, the approach and focus of the researcher is directly related to his ontologic position concerning the concepts of culture and human nature. That is to say, whether or not the researcher believes that "man has no choice in life, that culture determines his behavior," then he will or will not find it relevant

121 554 627 634 * 613 • 178 fully organized government behind the role, the element of force may enter into the rajal khair style of domination. Thus far, the 'umda and the shaikh roles have functioned through the traditional roles of the 'aqila and the rajal khair, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge. This is what I wish to explore.

121 571 554 177 The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people" or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area; and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and obligations in social relations are still relatively stable and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society, but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered important by the reference group to which they aspire, the Egyptian society. For example one sometimes heard the complaint from various members of the "status group" that the Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could speak for the Bedouin."

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159 and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
554 Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
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537 with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj
634 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
122 his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
522 reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 We can see how these details carry larger implications
177 within the context of political and social structures under-
• 178 going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
159 politically active and representative in both the traditional
554 and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
177 he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
178 of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

156 Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
159 around to the subject of international politics, whether this
554 was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
177 problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
178 Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend
124 the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
829 all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
577 identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

156 draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has
159 committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of
554 Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics
177 and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact.
178 When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of
124 changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the
829 time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring
[571] me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to
cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which
Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated
in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in
the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

156 Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference
159 between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the
554 others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the
571 difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's
574 house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan.
796 I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe
123 the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised
to find present no members of the "status group" but only
[556] their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is
[735] the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional
surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts,
and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not
have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
571 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
574 one for a modern leader.
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He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
829 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
582 speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.
[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the Middle East in general.

* 613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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Another thing which I do not like about our old ways is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse me. The 'aqila will then come to me and say: "If you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some of my family will support me in this, swearing that I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief will swear the oath and then they will believe him; and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

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Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouin into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

156 undertaken to transform his rijal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
829 the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
178 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
177 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the allocation of political values and distribution of power in terms of traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
634 go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
648 naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knows how to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.
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There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the 'awaiyid nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next 'umda) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the 'awaiyid either.

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This view contrasts sharply with the traditional views of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one 'agila voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

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If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their 'umda because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

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Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the 'awaiyid as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable
159 of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.
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178 Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive
177 ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces
829 al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert, here in particular, we need olive presses. This will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need
> [244] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert
> [489] plants them and the transportation is such that we cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest change in the desert results from the presence of 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or
> [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools, now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . . Another cause of change is due to the fact that everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he
> [207] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution
> [212] (tatawwur) is taking place, and the people here are realistic about it. For instance, I do not know reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I, and I know better than my father did, who lived in al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about
159 change, as we can note from the comment about the radio.
554 In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great
178 value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies
179 in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

156 imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at
159 the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali
554 realizes his marginal position between the new and the old,
178 and his attitude concerning change through education seems
177 to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on
156 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of
159 the psychological aspects underlying social change:
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> As I said before, the people here are realistic about change. There are now only about three or four of us who send our sons to study at the university, the rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it
159 is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community
554 are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins.
829 This is indicated by the following event. One month before
574 I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was
648 expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj 'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

439 market with more than one-third of its lamb meat. The other two-
[315] thirds of the lamb market was supplied from the Sudan, the Delta, and
[315] from Libya. Oil industry in Libya attracted a large number of the young
[178] tribal members in Libya, who had originally undertaken the main task of
[464] sheep pastoralism. As a result, the population of sheep and goats in Libya dropped sharply. Not only did the Libyan market become unable to supply the Egyptian market, but it was also unable to support itself and was forced to pay high prices for the Western Desert sheep and goats.
[457] The price became even more attractive after the devaluation of the Egyptian pound which gave higher value to the Libyan currency, and hence, the price of sheep. In the last decade, the number of smuggled sheep reached a point where it created a great shortage of lamb meat in Egypt. All government attempts to stop smuggling activities in either direction have failed.

657 All these factors attracted the attention of the government to the area and its people. The need to control the tribal population became evident. But since it is difficult, if not impossible, to control a population which is constantly on the move, the first step the government took to control the tribal population was to settle them in permanent villages. A number of projects are underway. The aims of these
[654] projects are to increase the cultivated land and to improve the pastures
[137] by introducing new and highly nutritive pasture plants in areas where agriculture is not feasible. Attempts have also been made to promote local crafts and industries. The intentional efforts of the government
[178] to settle the tribal population is supplemented by the gradual drift of
[464] many tribesmen, especially the younger generation, to seek part-time or

657 full-time employment with the government projects in the area and
[178] settle in fairly permanent houses near the place of work.
[464]

With the movement toward settling down, the relative legal and
657 political autonomy which Awlad Ali once enjoyed is breaking down. This
201 was reflected first in the loss of military exemption. In 1947, the
642 draft law was applied to all tribal populations in Egypt, including Awlad Ali. The application is not seriously enforced, however, due to the fact that births are still not recorded in the area. In 1954,
657 the "omda" or mayorship system practiced in the rural areas of Egypt
634 was extended to the Western Desert with certain modifications to fit
177 the tribal organization of populations in the area. This put a strain on the native system of leadership, a point which will be covered in
657 later chapters. Finally, and along with the extension of the omda sys-
692 tem, the jurisdiction of the legal system of the state was extended
177 over the area. This resulted in a duality in the judicial process.
178 The tribal law, with its traditional tribal mediators, is still functioning side by side with the modern court system of the state law. In many cases, especially in criminal cases, the individual is tried under both systems, and sometimes receives two different judgments for the same offense. Various efforts are being made to minimize the effects of this duality. In civil cases, the problem does not seem serious, since it is the parties themselves, or one of them, who voluntarily bring the case to the attention of the legal authorities. Therefore, they can choose between the traditional legal system and the modern courts of law. So far, civil cases are brought to the modern court system only when the native procedures fail to achieve a settlement. As such, the

657 modern court system may be viewed as a form of appeal to the tribal
692 justice. One has to be careful, however, in calling such a procedure
177 an appeal, since the tribal proceedings have no relevance in the court
178 proceedings.

69 The duality is more serious in criminal cases. When an act is de-
681 fined as illegal by both the tribal and modern law, persons committing
177 it come automatically under the jurisdiction of both laws. As long as such acts remain unknown to the police, the duality of procedures is not undertaken. This is possible in minor cases of assault or theft or adultery. But in major cases, such as homocide or serious assault resulting in the serious injury of a tribal member, it is difficult to keep the news a secret from the authorities. The funeral proceedings in the former cases and the medical attention needed in the latter cases
[627] are hard to conceal. Besides, serious cases start a whole series of
[521] mediations and go-betweens which always become the general knowledge in the entire area and the subject of conversation among the people. When the authorities know about such cases, they have to take immediate action to bring the offender to trial, even when the government authorities know that the tribal proceedings are being conducted in the case. Some attempts are made by both the tribal law and the modern law to minimize the effect of that duality. It is common that when the district attorney knows that a certain criminal case has been successfully solved according to the tribal proceedings, to ask for the minimum penalty for the offense. On the side of the tribal proceedings, once the case has been solved, the witnesses needed to testify for the prosecutor are instructed by their fellow tribesmen to refrain from giving the information

619 [173] Such traditions differentiate between these segments which otherwise occupy an equivalent position in the formal system.

This level of segmentation has no particular political significance except that it is at this level that the client tribes of Murabiteen are attached. People in the area differentiate between Awlad Ali proper, who are called the Sa'adi, and the Murabiteen tribes. Murabiteen tribes occupy a special position which tends to complicate the formal analysis of the tribal organization of the Awlad Ali. The Murabiteen are a number of tribes of varying sizes and origin which are attached to the Sa'adi tribes as their vassals or clients. They exhibit the same principles of tribal organization as the Sa'adi tribes except that they have no common origin similar to that of the latter groups.

619 173 The original division of the Murabiteen tribes among the Sa'adi was made in the famous meeting at El-Haqfa in which the division of land was also made and the Awlad Ali law was first enacted. The number of client groups attached to each Sa'adi tribe reflects the relative prestige and power of thatparticular tribe at the time of the meeting. Having a relatively large number of client tribes meant, in addition to prestige of the patron tribe, large financial support. Until half a century ago this financial support was in the form of an obligatory tribute or "sadaqa" which the client tribes had to pay. This tribute is no longer mandatory, but the client groups are still expected to present members of their patron tribes with gifts on occasions such as weddings, funerals or feasts of the tribal saint. Large vassal groups also meant support in fights. Although the client groups did not constitute part of the vengeance group of their Sa'adi, when the Sa'adi tribe fought, their client

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619 184 198 582 In recent years this has changed, however. The increased importance of wealth in the recently introduced money economy relaxed the endogamous tendency that was characteristic of the Sa'adi tribes.

619 184 In discussing the position of the Murabiteen tribes it is worth noting that not all the Murabiteen tribes in the area occupy the same position. Some enjoy relatively higher positions than the others. Actually, there are two kinds of Murabiteen in the area: Mustaqillen (independent Murabiteen); and the dependent Murabiteen. The latter are further subdivided into Murabiteen bil-baraka (with the blessing); and Murabiteen bil-sadaqa (with the tribute). The only independent Murabiteen in the area is the Gemei'at tribe. These are the original settlers of the area. Because of their help to Awlad Ali against the Hanadi, the [173] latter were defeated and Awlad Ali were able to occupy the Western Desert. For their part the Gemei'at tribe was granted its independence by Awlad Ali and were given one-third of the total area as their homeland (watan). 619 184 798 682 In theory, the Gemei'at tribe occupies the same position and has the same rights as the Sa'adi tribes, including the right to offer their protection which is denied to all other client groups. In practice, however, this seems to be of no practical value. None of my informants could remember a single case in which a murderer has taken refuge at a segment 619 798 184 682 629 628 of the Gemei'at tribe. The importance of the nazala is not merely to be safe from the pursuit of the victim's group but rather to provide the mediators who undertake the crucial task of negotiation on behalf of the murderer and his gorup. It is the ability to settle the dispute on a permanent basis that offers the actual long-lasting protection, even after the time of the nazala expires. To be successful in his pursuit,

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
625 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate house-
[464] holds seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pasture and
182 the animal population is upset by a draught, a segment of the human popu-
731 lation has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be con-
tinued for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be pur-
chased, and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and re-
stricted by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the draught continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
434 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
182 industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

613 If any disagreement between the
578 responsibility of the majority of the awaqil to persuade the minority to
571 conform to the majority's decision. This is usually done by simple per-
613 sonal persuasion. In certain instances, however, when a particular aqila
554 is known for being troublesome to the Amar, refusing to abide by the ma-
571 jority decisions, an attempt may be made by the others to build up pop-
578 ular support around another person in the Bait which the aqila represents.
If this strategy is successful, it might lead to replacing the aqila by another who is more abiding to the Amar's decisions. This approach is more likely to succeed if the aqila is not a popular person in his own Bait, for if he is popular, any attempt by the other Baits to disqualify the aqila would be viewed by the members of his Bait as interference in their own affairs and might lead them to rally even more strongly around their leader.

613 The other tendency occurring when the size of the Eilat increases
is toward the separation of one or more of its constituent Baits. Origi-
613 nally this was done by merely refusing to share in the payment of blood-
682 money. If this refusal continued, it was considered as a sign of
[178] separation of the Bait. In recent years this created problems with an increasing number of individuals claiming separation from the Amar to avoid the payment of the bloodmoney, while claiming membership when dis-
613 tribution is done. This led many tribal segments to require that the
675 "barawa" or separation of individuals or tribal units from any particular Amar should be put in writing, after getting the approval of the Amar to which he belonged. When the approval is given and the separation in put in writing, it is announced to all other tribal segments. If this is
[672] done, members of the separated tribal segment are not held responsible

613 individuals. He settles disputes among them and represents them in their
[627] disputes with outsiders. He is also the spokesman of his Bait in all matters involving the relationship of the Bait with the other tribal segments. He is responsible for the collection of the bloodmoney from members of his Bait and has the authority to confiscate property of individual members who refuse to pay their share. When a member is financially unable to pay his share, the Aqila is expected to pay for him and collect at a later time when the member is in a position to make such payment.

613 428 178 Originally the position of the Aqila was a hereditary one with the position passing from father to son. However, in recent years the rigidity of the patrilineal descent as the basis of succession to the position of the Aqila has been modified radically and other principles of selection have been introduced. The working of the principles underlying the selection of the Aqila will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter through the close examination of one of the major legal cases which occurred during my stay in the area.

613 [423] Thus each Bait is a division of one of the Eilas and this has its place in the formal tribal system. It constitutes a group with definite usufruct rights to land and a formally recognized leadership.

621 [613] But the actual residential units in which Awlad Ali live are not baits but parts of them in the form of separate camps or "nagei". The camps constitute the primary communities of Awlad Ali. A camp consists [594] of a number of tents ranging from four to twelve. Each tent is usually occupied by one nuclear family of a husband, his wife and children. In [595] cases of polygynous marriages, each wife usually occupies one tent with [361] her children. Each camp is separated from the next one by a distance which ranges from two to ten kilometers.

621 which ranges from two to ten kilometers. The camp coincides with the
233 herding unit. The herd of the camp is usually grazed as a unit, often
621 by a paid shepherd hired by the members of the camp as a whole. Origi-
233 nally the camp moved as a unit for grazing. This was essential in the
621 era of the tribal warfare and raiding where the security of the herd
361
178 and that of the people depended on such collective movement. In a type of organization adapted to periodical movement, the camp offered the optimum sized community: small enough to permit easy movement and large enough to offer the kind of protection which individual families could
621 not have offered. In this era the camp seemed to have been a closely
178 knit group. Many of the informants still remember the time when the
622 camp was under the strong control of the headman who made the major de-
361 cisions of where and when the camp should move. It was those decisions
233 that determined the safety and the security of the group. The headman had strong authority over members of his camp. Such authority was based mainly on his ability to exercise valid judgments as to whether or not the group should move and the route that it had to take if movement was decided upon. At the present time, and with the diminishing of raiding and tribal warfare in the area, the authority of the headman seems to have diminished along with it. The camp appears at the present time to be mostly a residential unit with minimal leadership and with a rapidly changing composition. Different families join the camp at different times during the year.

621 Although the membership of the camps is drawn from the bait, a camp
613 does not, in terms of its genealogical composition, make up a descent segment of that Bait. The membership of a camp is based on a completely

628 the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking
613 into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.

613 Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the
554 Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true
157 whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonableness and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila, they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are
613 admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the
554 question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally significant source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role
121 of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some
613 extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a
128 case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at lease part of it. The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The political unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves, some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they operate at a given point, were revealed.

613 usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own
682 financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to
[554] pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However,
● [178] in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits
closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among
613 these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large
178 number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers
166 or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among
464 certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage
369 of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent.
More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei'
have a full-time or part-time job.

613 The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on sal-
178 aries and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship
166 ties among members of these baits. With the prevalence of the individ-
464 ualistic attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more
682 reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more
369 and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial
obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within
613 the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay
554 from his own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are un-
556 able to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's per-
682 formance of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems
to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila.
613 In a well-integrated bait the popularity (or unpopularity) of the Aqila
554 among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal suc-
554 cession is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other con-
613 sideration. This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
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428 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
198 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
[166] more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
[464] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
613 of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
198 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
166 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, es-
464
561 pecially when they entail any financial liability. The older members
369 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people." Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a member of eilat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organization in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the po-
[556] litical support of the Aqila. This in turn makes wealth an important basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

613 554 that prevents the Awaqil of the amar from rallying support around another person.

613 178 554 In the case of the Aggary amar Hakim was their choice as the man to replace the original Aqila. What happened in the Aggary amar could never have happened if bait Asabei' were more cohesive than it was or if the kinship ties "were still strong and durable" as one important member of the Sanagrah tribe commented. "If there was any respect to the forefathers left, Hakim could never have agreed to replace Shei'eb....Nobody would dare take a position from someone who inherited it from his father.... but bait Asabei' is not as it used to be."

613 628 554 The third domain within which the Aqila normally pursues his activities is that of the wide scope of tribal society in the area. The Aqila represents his bait in all matters involving the bait either as a unit or any particular member of it with other tribal segments. When an individual from the bait is involved in a dispute with a member of another tribal segment, the Aqila acts as the legal representative and the attorney of that member trying to achieve a settlement which is not fair for his client but also fair for the other party. To be successful in this area, the Aqila relies on his own personal qualities and persuasive abilities. If the Aqila is known to be fair and honest, a quick and permanent settlement is usually achieved since he is trusted also by the other party. If, on the other hand, he has the reputation of using dishonest techniques, mistrust prevails and achieving a settlement is usually delayed.

Like the domain of the amar, the present field of activities is no major source for the Aqila's political support in the baits where kinship solidarity is strong. His success in solving disputes between members

634 554 659 who reach the age of military service. He is also supposed to report the presence of any fugitive or criminal in his district and report crimes occurring in that district and which involve members of the tribal segment he represents.

634 554 657 562 701 •178 The first two duties of the omda to the government do not involve any conflict of interest. Unlike the rural areas where sons are considered a very important economic asset to their parents, and therefore, there is a general resentment of military service which takes the sons away and deprives the parents of their important work around the fields, Awlad Ali look at military service as

1 On the basis of one percent of the yearly yield.

an opportunity to have their sons go to the city, obtain guaranteed payment, and escape the hardship of nomadic existence. Economic activities [233] in the area do not require the cooperation of a large number of individuals, and most of the grazing of animals is done either by a paid shepherd or by one of the grown-up sons. Although there still exists an [183] ideology which values having many sons, yet with the cessation of hostilities between the tribal segments, their presence in the area has lost its [464] value. Many of the younger generation are seeking jobs with the government projects in the area or in the city. Neither one is easy to find. Joining the army is increasingly considered as an easy alternative.

634 554 657 674 The omda's function which seems to involve some conflicting loyalties is that of reporting crimes involving members of his tribal segment. But even this does not pose a serious problem as it might seem. Almost all minor crimes committed against property or persons as well as all civil disputes are left to be handled by the tribal proceedings. The duties of the omda are limited to reporting the cases of murder and serious assault

582 of parley land or a well or to make him a partner in a business or smug-
557 gling activities or even as revenge on his uncle by keeping his daughters
582 unmarried. In 1961 the heads of 25 prominant baits of various tribes
557 in the area of Matruh met and decided that the right of ibn 'amm had
178 become a major problem, and that invoking that right when the man had
613 no intention of marrying the girl had resulted in a number of disputes that became serious over a period of time. They felt that the time was suitable to revise that right and make it subject to the concept of fair behavior applicable to other rights. They wrote a new rule which specifies that the man has the right to prevent his cousin from marrying an outsider or a more distant relative only if he himself intends to marry her either in the present or in the reasonable future. If the circumstances show that he cannot do so, then he forfeits the right.

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[558] To prevent his cousin from marrying another man without a proven
[681] intention on the part of the man to marry her himself in the foreseeable future, is considered as an unreasonable behavior for which ibn 'amm could be liable to pay kabara to his uncle as well as to the prospective groom. It also denies him the right of taking her away from
[683] her marital residence by force. If he does this, he would be liable to the compensation for assault. The agreement was signed by the mugtil and is considered binding as far as the baits they represented are concerned. Other tribal segments in the area refuse to abide by the agreement and consider it as a pretentious departure from the ways of Awlad Ali which should not be encouraged. Even within the tribal segments involved in the agreement, there have been reports of individuals who refused to
[629] abide by the agreement. In certain of these latter cases, the ibn 'amm selected as his mardi a member of a tribal segment not involved in the agreement and therefore not morally bound to abide by its contents.

legal guardian and considered a bride price to compensate the father as the legal guardian of the bride. In earlier times the bride received none of the mahr, although she usually got a sadaq or bridal gift for herself. In Islamic Arabia, the mahr and the sadaq became indistinguishable and were given to the woman and took the form of a legal gift for affecting the marriage. The Koraan no longer contains the concept of the purchase of the wife, and the mahr becomes a compensation which the woman has to claim in all cases. The Koraan demands a bridal gift for a legal marriage: "And give them whom ye have enjoyed their reward as a wedding gift" (Sura, iv. 24), and again, "And give the women their dowries voluntarily" (Sura, iv. 3). According to the Koraan, the mahr remains the property of the wife and remains her own even if the marriage is dissolved by divorce. But although it took the form of a gift, the mahr remained in Islamic law a prerequisite for the legalization of the marriage.[1] It is only upon the giving of the mahr that the marriage is considered valid. No marriage is legal, according to the Islamic law, unless that transfer of the mahr is affected. Mutual consent of the two parties to forfeit the mahr does not change that rule, and the marriage is considered void. According to Muslim jurisprudence, marriage is a contract ('acd) made between the bridegroom and the bride or her wali or guardian. An essential element in that contract is the mahr. The jurists themselves are not sure about the nature of the mahr. Some regard it as practically a purchase money or as an equivalent ('iwad) for the possession of the woman and the rights over her, so it is like a price paid in a contract of sale; while other jurists see in the mahr a legal symbol, a mark of honor and a proper legal security of property for the woman.

583 Among Awlad Ali the payment of the bridewealth signifies the com-
[584] pletion of the marriage contract. The mahr is not paid to the woman but
583 to her father or closest male kin. Usually the mahr is paid in money.
178 This, however, seems to be a recent phenomenon. Until the turn of the
century, according to informants, the mahr was paid only in sheep and
583 goats. The practice is still followed by a number of tribal segments
178 of Ali Ahmar who occupy the western most part of the area where pasture
184 is more abundant and reliable and where the permanent pasture of the
green mountains of Cyrenaica is close by. Other tribal segments still
insist that at least one-fourth of the mahr should be paid in livestock,
583 but the majority of the people accept money. The main purpose of the
[584] mahr among Awlad Ali is to legalize the marriage contract and to put
[182] emphasis on the reciprocal oblications that the marriage creates between
the two families of the bride and the groom. It also works as an in-
surance for good behavior on the part of both the husband and the wife.
583 If the husband mistreats his wife or fails to give her the rights legally
593 hers by marriage, he risks the chance of losing the mahr and being forced
586 to divorce her. On the other hand, if the wife fails to behave in the
customary way expected from a wife, the husband could divorce her and
have the right to get back his mahr. This is particularly inconvenient
in cases where all or part of the mahr is paid in livestock, in which
case it becomes part of the father's herd and hard to take away in case
of divorce. It is therefore in the interest of her family to keep the
marriage. In this way their interference in the marriage is checked.
[591] This is especially important among Awlad Ali where, although the mar-
[592] riage is usually patrilocal, the woman retains membership in her father's
household even after marriage.

581 Marriage does not deprive the woman of some rights of her own.
585 The customary law gives the wife three basic rights corresponding to
562 those of the husband's sexual services, domestic work, and obedience.
671 Corresponding to the first of these, the wife has the right to have a normal sexual life with her husband. This right, however, is not an exclusive one, since the husband can marry more than one wife. A woman
585 can be divorced from her husband without having to return the mahr if
586 she claims that the husband is unable to perform his sexual duties. In
593 such cases, the marriage is usually dissolved quietly. In certain rare instances, the husband may deny his wife's accusations. If both insist
585 on their stand, one or both may ask to be submitted to "bait el-shana'a,"
586 or house of the dreadful deeds. Reports are extremely vague about the
593 exact procedures involved in this case. Some informants stated that the
629 married couple would live in a tent without sidewalls so that everybody could see what goes on inside. Most informants, however, insist that it merely means that the couple move their tent near that of a respectable man whose word is believed and honored. This man is supposed to keep a close watch on the couple's activities, by listening or looking through holes in the tent. His verdict determines the future of the marriage.
582 If the wife is justified in her claim, the husband is forced to divorce
681 her and to forfeit his mahr. If, on the other hand, the verdict is for
558 the husband, he not only can divorce her and get back the mahr, but is also entitled to kabara, or compensation, for his injured pride. There
114 is no case of bait el-shana'a in the area during the time of the field
178 work, and most people insist that this practice is something of the past
583 when the mahr was relatively high and was paid in livestock, in which

2: Mohsen E.O-5 (1958-1966) 1971 MIT Libraries Barcode MIT
Awlad Ali

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case its return to the husband would have caused great financial inconvenience for the wife's family.

Corresponding to the second right, the husband's right to his wife's domestic work, is the wife's right to maintenance. The husband has to support his wife. This includes providing her and her children with adequate food and proper clothing. If the husband fails to do so because of poverty, sickness, crop failure or unexpected disasters, the wife's brother or father provides her and her children with the necessary food and clothing. [586] If the husband's failure to fulfill his duties is due to neglect, the wife can leave him and go to her father or brother who talks the matter over with the husband who, in turn, either agrees to their demands or has to divorce his wife and forfeit his mahr.

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Finally, corresponding to the husband's right to his wife's obedience is the wife's right to fair treatment by her husband. There are a number of ways in which the wife is mistreated. One is excessive punishment; although the right of the husband to punish his wife is provided in the Koraan, the punishment must be excessive or severe. Belal did not draw a line between acceptable and severe punishment. A punishment is severe if it results in something that other people can see or hear. If the husband insults his wife or her family and others hear the action, or if he beats her and this results in visible traces, then the punishment is severe.

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A wife considers herself mistreated if the husband, when married to more than one, treats any of the other wives better than he treats her. Although the wife cannot deny her husband the right to have additional wives, he must give them all equal treatment. This includes

682 628 last two decades). But a feud in the form of extensive, long-term killing between two groups is very rare among Awlad Ali. The principle of life for life upon which a feud operates would rarely lead to a permanent settlement or peace, even when the sense of revenge is satisfied for the 682 moment. Among the group, this form of permanent settlement is more likely to be achieved through the payment of bloodmoney, or "diyya." The payment of the diyya is based on the assumption that the group has lost, in the deceased, an economic asset. It has been deprived of his services, both in supporting his immediate family and in the collective activities of his amar. This is illustrated in the distribution of the bloodmoney. Only half of the bloodmoney is paid to the immediate family of the victim, the other half being divided equally among adult males of his amar or vengeance group. This is intended not only to satisfy their sense of indignation and curb their desire for revenge, but also to insure that when the time comes to share in the payment of the bloodmoney, they will pay.

628 619 726 178 The cessation of feuds in the area seems to coincide with the cessation of inter-tribal and intra-tribal warfare. During the era of tribal warfare, the killing of a tribesman meant the loss in the fighting power of his tribal segment, and feuding, with its emphasis on life for life, had the purpose of restoring the balance in fighting power among the 682 groups involved. Monetary compensations were not known in the area during that time, according to the informants' accounts, but they were usually restricted to cases where either the victim or the killer was a 178 non-tribal person. With the cessation of tribal warfare, the death of 682 a tribal member became more an economic, rather than a political, loss. 619 726

178 682 619 [172] 682 and compensation became more and more accepted in settling murder cases among the tribal population. Bloodmoney, or diyya," was established among compensations for injury in general. This scale of compensation is based on the amount of loss of normal activities the injury caused the victim with death being the total loss of such activities. The compensation for homocide is estimated at L.E.400 for intentional killing, and L.E. 300, for unintentional killing. Although reference here is made to "intention," the assessment of that intention and its definition are quite different from the general usage of that term among modern jurists. Among modern jurists, the term refers to a state of mind which implies that the offender willfully and knowingly committed the prohibited act. This means, first, that the person is able to recognize the nature of his act and to distinguish between right and wrong. Secondly, it means that the person was in a position to choose between committing the act and not committing it and took the former path. According to this view, individuals under temporary or permanent insanity, children under the legal age (the definition of which varies from one legal system to another), non-human beings and objects are not capable of having criminal intent, since they are incapable of having a will of their own. Similarly, individuals who are capable of having a will but, because of certain circumstances their freedom of choice was impaired, cannot also have intentions. Intention, then, in the modern legal conception is a psychological quality that connects the offender with the prohibited result or results. It is this psychological connection that differentiates in modern legal systems between murder and manslaughter, between attempted murder and simple assault, between first and second degree murder, and between justifiable

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3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

or swaying into convulsions. Indeed, it is noticeable that the Orders which permit such practices, notably the 'Arusiya, 'Isawiya, Rifa'iya, and Sa'adiya, so popular in the towns of Libya, have made no converts among the true Bedouin.

It is unnecessary to discuss further the mystical side to the Sanusiya for another reason. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica with whom this book is concerned have only the slightest knowledge of either the religious teachings or the ritual of the Order, and are interested in neither. They belong to the illiterate class of the *Muntasabin*, the simple adherents of the Order who follow its Shaikh personally and politically. It is very seldom, if ever, that the Bedouin know the special prayers and litanies of the Order, and their use of them, if any, is restricted to getting a scribe to write them on paper so that they can sew them up in leather and tie them to their bodies. It is only a tiny educated minority who regularly recite the prayer formulas and litanies. These are the *Ikhwan*, the Brothers of the Order. They live in the lodges of the Order and hold prayer-meetings there. Among the Brothers are some who have been raised to the position of Shaikhs of lodges, generally, in past times, after special training at the University of the Order at Jaghbub oasis, where they have received a diploma from the Head of the Order or from one of his family or inner circle. This inner circle, the *Khawass*, consists vaguely to-day of a few senior members of the Sanusi family and two or three learned Brothers and does not function as a Body, but in the past it was, according to Sayyid Muhammad Idris, an official Council controlling the affairs of the Order and was composed of four Shaikhs of the Order, who were not of the Sanusi family, under the presidency of the Head of the Order, who had to be a member of the founder's family. As Dr. Adams points out,[1] the fact that this inner circle is no longer a determinate Body indicates a change in the character of the Order, a development of its political, to the detriment of its religious, functions. This development has favoured the interests of the Sanusi family to the disadvantage of the Order as a whole.

The *Shaikh al-Tariqa*, Head of the Order, advised in past times by his Council, appoints the Shaikhs of the lodges and these Shaikhs can ordain Brothers and the Brothers can receive

[1] C. C. Adams, 'The Sanusiya Order', *Handbook on Cyrenaica*, 1944, p. 31.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

Arabian ways. In Egypt necessity has slowly subjugated the exiles to the peasant yoke. They long resisted but, like the Bedouin nomads coming from the Sinai Peninsula, had in the end to submit or perish. The absence of a substantial peasantry in Cyrenaica is one of the characteristics which most distinguish it from the Arab societies of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and the Maghrib. The peasant can be dominated. He is fixed to the earth and can be made to surrender it and till it for others. The Cyrenaican Bedouin is fixed to no place and cannot be forced to sell his birthright by bad seasons or intimidation. This has meant that there have not been in Cyrenaica any social enclaves attached to the towns through which the towns and administrative centres could lord it over the Bedouin. Outside the towns all is Bedouin and the Turkish Administration, and afterwards the Italian Administration, found that they could not get a grip on the Bedouin of Cyrenaica as they could on the peasantry of Tripolitania.

Nevertheless the towns and the Turkish, and later the Italian, Administration in them affected the tribal system by acting as a pull on those tribal segments which lived nearest to them, so that the tribes which lay between the towns and the steppe were attracted towards one or other of these poles. The political structure of Cyrenaica as a whole exercised in this way a significant influence on the segmentary tribal system.

IV

The Bedouin who became followers of the Sanusiya Order and whose country and way of life I have described are divided into tribes and tribal sections owning different tracts of the country. This tribal system existed in Cyrenaica long before the Grand Sanusi preached there and it continued to exist after his grandson Sayyid Muhammad Idris had fled the country and the Sanusiya Order had been abolished and its lodges destroyed by the Italians. It is the fundamental structure of Bedouin society which the Sulaimid tribes brought with them from Arabia.

The Bedouin of Cyrenaica are Arabs. The Arabian tribes who conquered the country and settled in it mixed with the indigenous Berbers, as is evident in their physical features to-

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

Order concurred. Thus we find charge of a zawiya continuing in the hands of a single family to the point at which Muhammad Yahiya bin al-Sanusi bin 'Umar al-Ashhab was appointed by Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif to succeed his father as Shaikh of Msus at the age of sixteen. Some of these families sent their roots so deep that not only did they obtain what amounted to hereditary rights to a particular lodge, but controlled several lodges. Such were the influential families of Ghumari, Kalili, Farkash, and Ashhab, and the Khattabi families.

Hence we find to-day that many of the lodges are in hereditary charge of a family of Shaikhs who consider that they have a pre-emptive claim to its directorship and to enjoyment of its revenues, a claim backed by tribal opinion and by the acquiescence of the present Head of the Order. Thus the Dardafi family may be said to own the Shahhat lodge, the Isma'ili family to own the Fayidiya lodge, the 'Ammur family to own the Qafanta lodge, and so on. So much is this the case that disputes now sometimes arise, as in 1942 at Qafanta and Mirad Mas'ud, between members of a family about which of its members should succeed to the directorship of a lodge and control of its revenues.

This development is not surprising. Poor communications and the troubled times since 1911 have encouraged local autonomy in the Sanusiya organization. The Shaikh of a lodge brought up his family in it and his sons had no other home than the lodge and no other friends than the Bedouin around it and the families of Shaikhs in nearby lodges. Tribesmen dislike change and prefer to have for the Shaikhs of their lodges members of families they know and who share their local interests. But the tendency towards hereditary succession is also related to the fundamental lineage structure of the tribes among whom the lodges are distributed, for it is noticeable that whereas hereditary succession became customary in the Bedouin, or tribal, lodges, it has been by comparison lacking in the urban lodges of Banghazi and Darna and in those oases where tribal structure has become obscured by village life. This would seem to suggest that *Ikhwan* families tend the more easily to become stabilized as lines of hereditary Shaikhs the more closely they are associated with tribal structure. It is precisely in the most powerful, numerous, and integrated tribal sections that we

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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*795 554 *648 Sudanese against the French in 1902 and, as we will see, it was they who roused the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and of large parts of Tripolitania and Fazzan against the Italians in 1911; and it was they who attempted, unsuccessfully, to rouse the Bedouin of Egypt against the British in 1915. It was, above all, their propaganda and personal example in the field which made the struggle against Italy a national war and a religious crusade. [[798] To-day they have been broken by death, exile, and expropriation, and are poor and ignorant, but in the heyday of their power the Turks rightly estimated their influence and were careful not to encroach on their prerogatives.

VI

*795 12 182 The thesis I have maintained in the foregoing pages, that the Sanusiya kept its cohesion and developed into a political organization largely because it was identified with the tribal system of the Bedouin, is supported by the lack of cohesion, common direction, and political influence of the other Islamic Orders in Libya, which won adherents only in the towns of Cyrenaica and among the citizens and peasants of Tripolitania, and in neither country found support among the Bedouin. I mention these other Orders for this reason, and also because a reference to them, however brief, places the Sanusiya in a more general setting as only one among many Darwish Orders. These other Orders are, however, described barely, since the part they have played in the political history of Cyrenaica is negligible.

*795 The following Orders besides the Sanusiya are represented in Cyrenaica: Qadiriya, Rifa'iya, 'Arusiya, 'Isawiya, Tayyibiya, 'Azuziya, Madaniya, and Sa'adiya. The Qadiriya and the Rifa'iya are the only two classical Orders with lodges in the country, though the others eventually trace their descent from classical sources by those tortuous ramifications so confusing to the student of Islamic fraternities.

The distribution of the lodges of these Orders in Cyrenaica at the present time is shown in the table opposite. A knowledge of the history of the Orders is not necessary for an understanding of the history of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica and is therefore omitted. It is necessary only to know that they all entered Cyrenaica from the west, both those, the majority,

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 86]

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

tion which enable the genealogy to remain constant in length and fixed in form despite its dynamic content.

One of the main processes at work in foreshortening genealogies is that referred to by Evans-Pritchard as telescoping.[8] This process is also a characteristic feature of the Cyrenaican genealogy, although its effects, to be discussed presently, differ conspicuously. The way in which telescoping works in the Cyrenaican genealogy is that several male names come to be omitted in the genealogy below the name of the founding ancestor of the tertiary group. Usually, the form in which this occurs it that the name of a famous tribesman, and particularly his nickname if he has one, is retained along with the personal names of his lineal descendants in successive generations. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Haiba tertiary section of the Magharba tribe:



[8] 'It is evident, moreover, that since the minimal lineage consists of four or five actual steps in ascent, there has been telescoping of the agnatic line from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan, for the founder of the minimal lineage was himself the extremity of another minimal lineage which has, by increase in generations, become the minor lineage, and so on' (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1940, p. 199). Since Evans-Pritchard first wrote on the telescoping of genealogies among the Nuer, other anthropologists have discussed the process in various systems. Fortes, Richards, Laura Bohannan, Cunnison, and Mitchell in their writings on the Tallensi, Bemba, the Tiv, the Luapula people, and the Yao respectively are notable examples . . . As the mode of manipulation of Bedouin genealogies is marginal to my present problem, the main comparison is not with these works but with Evans-Pritchard's earlier work on the Nuer, because the Bedouin and Nuer lineage system have more in common than either have with the other systems, excepting possibly the Tiv.

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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The line shows five male names in all. The eldest surviving members of this line is Sa'aid, who almost invariably is referred to, not by his personal name, but as Bu Shliby,[9] and on the infrequent occasions when his personal name is used it is followed by Bu Shliby and not by his father's name, which is the more common practice. Again, Abdul Qadar, when his father is not about, is called Bu Shliby, and when it is necessary to give him his personal name Bu Shliby is added, except among his more intimate family kindred, when only his personal name would be used. Likewise, his son Yunis carries Bu Shliby in addition to his personal name and is sometimes even referred to as Bu Shliby only. Abdul Qadar had never known his grandfather, was aware however of his existence in the past, but did not feel it necessary to use his name, and whatever obligation he might have felt to keep the memory of his grandfather alive, he fulfilled it when he named his son after him. Many of the older members of the group are also aware of the lineal connexions between Bu Shliby and Yunis, even though they use this knowledge in a genealogical context only, but many of the younger men of the group do not know these details. It is clear that when the boy Yunis grows to old age, three names in this line will have ceased to be used.

This practice of adding to a personal name the name of a deceased ancestor making one the son of the other, is pushed to the extent of carrying forward through the generations a nickname which referred to some peculiar characteristic of the ancestor, but which has little relation to the present bearer. Thus the ancestor whose name has been retained might have been nicknamed 'The Lame One' or 'The Squint-Eyed One' because he suffered either of these personal defects; or he might have been nicknamed 'The Old One' because he lived to a ripe old age. Such nicknames might later be carried by men who are not lame, nor squint-eyed, nor old, while the names of the intervening ancestors are dropped in normal use.

Another process is at work, which needs to be distinguished from telescoping, for although the results in genealogical terms are similar, Bedouin view it in quite a different light. This is the process of fusing names. It is common practice among the Bed-

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[9] The prefix *Bu* is used by the Bedouin to mean 'son of.'

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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ouin—and, for that matter, Arabs in other lands—to name a boy after a deceased relative. Rarely is a boy named after his father, unless the father's death occurs before the boy is born, in which circumstance, the new-born boy would certainly take his father's name. A much more common form of this practice is to name a boy after his grandfather, assuming the latter to be dead. The eldest son usually accepts this responsibility, but it by no means falls invariably to him. There is a number of reasons for this, but they need not concern us here, since they are of no relevance to the general argument. What is of concern at present is that one name in the genealogy might represent the fusion of several other similar names. When circumstances permit, an individual's line might run as follows: Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad—'Ali—Muhammad. It is true that the man himself and those closely related to him might know full well that there are three men named Muhammad and two named 'Ali, but it would not be considered irregular if only one Muhammad and one 'Ali were given in the genealogy. A mature man, giving his genealogy, omitted his father's name, Ibrahim. When asked about the omission, he insisted that he had given it, and when he was told that the name Ibrahim given by him was intended to refer to his young son, he impatiently dismissed the matter with the observation that having given the name Ibrahim once, it mattered little whether it had been put in the position of his son or father. Pointing to his son he added, 'There is my father, Ibrahim. He has taken my father's position, has he not?'

By the fusion of names, several persons drop out of the genealogy, and by and by, the line comes to be shortened. It also has the effect of giving a person's name a weighting which otherwise it would not possess. In a sense, a young son named after a father is not merely a son but a father and possibly a great-grandfather also. The young boy becomes the contemporary carrier of the personalities of those of similar name who have preceded him, while the behaviour of the living towards him is, in virtue of this, affected in a number of details. A man who had named his son in this way, explained the matter thus: 'He is my son, but also my father because he has his name. I cannot beat him for it would be like beating my father. When he grows up and I grow old, he will look after me as if I were his son.'

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Fusion of names appears in another context and for similar reasons. Not only are lineal descendants given the name of deceased ancestors, but a man may be given the name of any deceased agnate of his tertiary section. Usually, this is only done when a man passes on property to another who is not his direct heir. Commonly, this occurs when an agnate is also a mother's brother, as often happens as a result of parallel cousin marriage, and this mother's brother has no sons of his own. If he has a sister's son, who is also his paternal nephew, he is likely to pass on his wealth to this nephew. A father, the Bedouin insist, ought to perform three duties for his sons: attend to their circumcision, and their education in the Koran, and provide bride-wealth when they marry. All fathers attend to the circumcision of all their sons; few provide for the Koranic education of any of their sons; most bear the burden of marrying off at least one of their sons. The performance of the latter duty is what makes the continuance of the deceased's name an obligation, and whoever performs this duty must have his name perpetuated in one male offspring of the union which was brought about with his wealth. Wealth need not take the form of bride-wealth; it can be a legacy willed by a father, maternal uncle of the kind described above, or any other agnate who has died without male issue. Conversely, if a man dies without leaving any property, even his sons might not perpetuate his name, and eventually it will drop out of the genealogy.[10] There are instances of men inheriting the wealth of a number of agnates, using each parcel of wealth to make a new marriage and naming the sons of the various unions after the several dead who had left wealth. The example given below is taken from the genealogy of the Dawwas section of the Magharba tribe. What happened here was that the two lines stemming from Faraj and Sha'aban, after proliferating normally, became extinct. As this happened, Ibrahim, the son of Miftah, began to inherit wealth to which he was not a direct heir; and

[10] To avoid confusion, it ought to be made clear that this is not ghost marriage. As I understand ghost marriages from Evans-Pritchard's (1951) account, two main conditions must be satisfied: (i) that there should be inherited wealth to make a marriage, and (ii) that the wealth remaining after the ghost marriage has been made is inherited by the ghost children only. In Cyrenaica, wealth thus inherited becomes part of a man's total wealth and is not reserved for a ghost marriage and its issue.

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as he did so, he entered into a plurality of marriages, begat sons, and replaced those men in the genealogy who had died without heirs. In the following generation the twin process of death and replacement continued. Death removed all the male descendants of Sha'aban and Faraj, and of Ibrahim Bu Miftah's many sons only two, Sharif and Abdallah, were of age to marry at the time of my visits to their camp. Both had enjoyed a plurality of wives, although still young to have done so, and each marriage they contracted took place after the death of one of their kinsmen. The full and intricate details of this interesting genealogy are irrelevant here, since all the example is intended to show is how nine of eleven male names were perpetuated in the genealogy by repeating five of them twice and four of them three times, accounting in all for twenty-two names; and to do this, three men (one of them had died, but the other two were both under forty years of age) married eight wives. All the names in the two lines which have died out have not yet been brought back into the genealogy, but 'Abdallah, the son of Ibrahim, who had already done extremely well in this respect, was confident that soon the obligations towards Musa, Abd al-Rahim, and Sa'ad would be redeemed.

Thus the fusion of names not only ensures that names threatened with extinction are perpetuated, but that one person, in the name he bears, can carry the genealogical burden of several other men of that name.



FIG. 18-2 GENEALOGY 2. The names of dead men are underlined.

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173 Telescoping of names, and fusion of names, taken together,
178 can account for the fixity of the genealogy to a large extent. In
551 addition, lines which showed every sign of normal development
613 at one time, have petered out completely, even after they have sometimes assumed the status of tertiary segments. Conditions
173 under which this is likely to happen are not difficult to envisage.
178 If hearsay evidence is correct, disease, when it strikes in the
551 desert, might rage in a camp like wild fire, bringing death to
613 many, but not spreading to other camps, because the camps are
731 so far apart. Even in springtime when men and beasts are to-
361 gether in the pastures, and the larger summer camp has split into four or five smaller ones, the distance between camps may still be
[221] a few miles. In summer, when camps are concentrated on the large watering points, the distances between them are considerably more. Disease, therefore, does not spread from camp to camp as rapidly as one might expect in such primitive conditions of living. In 1949 a number of men of a small camp died within a
[761] few days of each other. Bedouin opinion attributed these deaths
[784] to an allegedly false oath sworn by the deceased a year earlier. Medical opinion ascribed them to filth in a well which the deceased had been cleaning before their illness. In any event, a
173 thriving line of a lineage was wiped off the genealogy. The por-
178 tion of the Dawwas genealogy shown on this page shows a
613 similar process at work. Again, to give another example, the Nasr section of the Magharba tribe once included six tertiary sections, not four as are now given. Two of these six sections are now represented by only four men of whom two are too old and decrepit to have heirs any longer, and are unmarried in any case; a third, whose wife has long passed child-bearing age, had two sons, but both died before marriage; and the fourth, a very poor and old man, has only one daughter, and is a widower. Three of the four now live with their collateral tribal section, Madhkur, and count themselves members of this group. That they once belonged to two different groups might have passed unnoticed were it not that two elders of the Madhkur section insisted that they should be correctly placed and their entire genealogies be recorded. The younger men argued that although they were aware that the two groups named Farjiani and al-Khadhar at one time

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existed, it was pointless giving them separate status any longer; they were content to give the three men separate lines of a few

generations, and then to tag them on to Madhkur, the founding ancestor of the segment.

Telescoping, fusion of names, and the extinction of lines are three ways in which the general fixed shape of the genealogy is retained. These three processes are only sufficient, however, in special circumstances, but before discussing these circumstances one further general condition relating to these processes must be made explicit. All three affect the genealogy within the tertiary segments only, and do not affect it at any of the more superior orders of segmentation. There is not a shred of evidence from contemporary Cyrenaican genealogies to show that telescoping or fusion occurs except within the tertiary segment, within that group, in other words, where precise genealogical links are known and can be specified, and within that small group which for most part of the year constitutes a single settlement. It is possible that groups of structurally superior levels to the tertiary have become extinct, in the way that tertiary lines have petered out. There is no definite evidence to support this, and from the analysis of Cyrenaican genealogies in general it seems that when any group is threatened with extinction—and this in turn means that fewer and fewer people will be using the same land and water facilities—there is a definite tendency for the lineage rump to fuse with a collateral lineage (and in so doing fuse their resources with those of the adopting lineage), or for a numerically more powerful lineage group to take it over by force. The number of tertiary segments spanned by a secondary segment, therefore, increases or decreases according to the circumstances; so that a secondary segment, numerically strong in its tertiary segments to-day, may become considerably weaker in future, and the numerically weak secondary section of to-day may proliferate its segments substantially in the future. Short of a significant de-

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cline in the total population of a tribe, then, the extinction of lines does not affect any order of segmentation superior to the tertiary. In this respect, the Cyrenaican genealogy differs fundamentally from those collected from the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard. In the quotation from his work on Nuer genealogies (1951), he asserts that telescoping occurs 'from the founder of the minimal lineage further up the line of ascent to the founder of the clan'. This major difference has serious implications for any discussion of lineage proliferation, but these must be left until the conditions under which proliferation is likely to occur have been analysed.

While it is true that the processes discussed are of importance in retaining the general shape of the genealogy, what is assumed so far is that the Cyrenaican population has been stable over long periods. Stability of population is not an unreasonable assumption to make for a people who live on the margin of subsistence in a country where extended periods of drought are not infrequent, though seldom leading, it is true, to actual famine conditions, but producing periodic and local food and water shortages. Disease, following quickly in the trail of shortage, it can be assumed, kept the relationship of total population to the natural resources fairly constant. What evidence there is does not support even this very general assumption, since it is known that there have been large-scale tribal wars in the past, and a certain amount of movement of tribes, some being displaced and others pushed eastwards into Egypt. Unless these shifts were caused by increases in the aggregate population and the consequent pressure on land and water, it is difficult to account for them. This consideration of possible overall increases in population in the past poses interesting problems related to lineage structure which cannot be adequately treated here. For the moment it is proposed to neglect possible increases in the total population during past periods in the history of Cyrenaica. The historical depth of the view now to be discussed is about seventy years, and for this period I have no evidence of any large-scale increases in population. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume a general stability of population for this period. But the vagaries of the Cyrenaican climate are such that, in a given year, one area might be well drenched with rain, giving excellent pastures for animals and good crops, while a nearby territorial strip might suffer a partial

drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all their members. It was these latter segments which were in the process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy, proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular names become significant within the minimal segment, they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy. In order to include these successively additional names, names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

Although I must confess that I now find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's view of genealogical growth and development as stated for the Nuer, it was the view I originally held with regard to Bedouin genealogies. Indeed, thinking in genealogical terms only, it appears inevitable that the addition of successive generations can only mean the lengthening of the genealogy, or, if the length is to remain constant, extrusion of ancestral names must take place at the apex of the genealogy. If this view is to be accepted, several other conclusions must be accepted with it. The genealogy, as far as it goes at least, is an accurate record of descent—some names may have been lopped off at the top, but otherwise the genealogy represents a faithful statement of succession. Again, if successive generations are to be added to the genealogy, then its base must continually expand laterally. From what is known of contemporary Bedouin genealogies, there is no evidence which leads to the supposition that their base is progressively widening. With regard to the authenticity of the names in the genealogy, above the point of tertiary segmentation, I hope to show in a subsequent article on Bedouin genealogies in general, that names above the tertiary point of segmentation have remained fixed for very long periods of time, and that they bear slight relation to the passage of generations over the last century at least; moreover, in this article I hope to demonstrate that what manipulation of the genealogy takes place does not affect more than about four or five ascending generations from the living.

Part of the difficulty in a study of this sort lies in the strong temptation to think of the genealogy *per se*, even though it is readily admitted that it has a value in itself for the Bedouin. Yet even in these terms the genealogy must always represent an ordered grouping of people, and these people live on strips of territory. The starting point of the analysis then ought to begin with the territorial ordering of groups of people. The relation of groups of people to land, moreover, is determined by the carrying capacity of that land, and it is this prerequisite which is the main variable in discussing genealogical manipulation, and not the other way about. The main landmarks of the Cyrenaican ecology are fixed points which cannot be manipulated to fit in with the genealogy; it is the genealogy which must be altered to comprehend the distribution of people in their ecological setting.

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121 173 613 619 178 If, moreover, the view of a genealogy as a continually expanding line of descent is to be accepted, it must be accepted also that large structural units, even in conditions of population stability, are to experience a continuous re-ordering of their structural relationships. In practice, what this means is that a tribe of, say 20,000 souls cease to be tribesmen of a named tribe and instead all become members of an almost identical group but with a different name. To take an example from the genealogy given [162] on page 365: the Magharba tribe shown there has a total population of some 13,000 souls. If proliferation affected the topmost limits of this tribe, the apical name disappears and presumably the name of one of the primary sections is to be substituted. That is, half the tribe would have to take on the lineage name of their opposed primary section. The only alternative to the use of the name of a primary segment as a substitute for the abandoned tribal name is the acceptance by 13,000 people of a totally new name, which is most unlikely.

It is reasonable to assume therefore, that the genealogy, in its general form, is fixed for long periods of time at least. This still leaves the problem of how and where adjustments are made to face the contingencies of birth and death, of the succession of generations, and of the irregular increases and decreases of population among the tertiary segments. An important clue lies in the number of segments which appear at the various orders of segmentation. From Sa'ada, the founding ancestress, in the line which runs to Nasr, each ancestor is shown as having a pair of sons for four orders of segmentation. At the fifth generation from Sa'ada—this is now the secondary order of segmentation within the tribe—the number of sons increases to four. Not all tribes will show the same number of sons at each generation as the Magharba—some, for example, might show three instead of two at the primary order—but what is true of all tribes is that there is evident consistency in the number down to and including the fifth generation from Sa'ada; if, that is to say, one of a tribe's primary segments is divided into three secondary sections, the other one or two, as the case may be, will be divided likewise. Throughout the tribes in Cyrenaica, then, segmentation of orders superior to the tertiary segments shows a pronounced consistency in their numbers.

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stretching across to the village of Ajadabiya in the east, topples in undulations away into the flat expanses of the desert to the south. At all these points of segmentation, the territories occupied by the various sections are large and roughly defined, and the population aggregates supported on these territories run from over a thousand at one end to tens of thousands at the upper limits. The tertiary sections are numerically much smaller, some of them numbering as few as a hundred souls in all, and the territories to which they are attached are correspondingly smaller. The relationship between the numbers in this order of section, and the precise amount of water available in the local wells is an intimate one. If the population of one of these groups increases, or if the number of animals rises, or if the springs show a decline in the volume of water they give forth, or if the winter rainfall has allowed the storage in wells of only a small quantity of water, a rearrangement of the group must be effected. A significant alteration of any one of these components must mean that the local group must split to enable a new adjustment to be made in the relationship of man and animals to water.

Whatever changes occur within groups of any size, since the genealogy embraces the entire population, these must appear on the genealogy in some way or other. Now a genealogy is as rigid a framework, as fixed and final a pattern of grouping, as can be imagined. The impression that they are thus rigid and fixed, except for the addition of successive generations, is strengthened by the way in which the Bedouin use them. From their young boys to their old men, the Bedouin are expert genealogists, and the names of ancestors, for one reason or another, are never far from their lips. Names are kept alive by constant use, since all references to inter-group relationships must be in terms of these names. More than this, the Bedouin were proud to the point of boastfulness of their genealogical knowledge, and, wherever I travelled, the first request I had to comply with was to take down a large portion of a tribal genealogy. In recording their endless genealogies, one feature about them came to assume increasing interest; while there was remarkable unanimity with regard to most of the names given, there was one point of marked ambiguity—at the tertiary level of segmentation. I recorded genealogies in four tribes on an extensive scale, and in each tribe

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619 change their structural position only rarely. The latter change
621 sometimes does, however, occur, and there is evidence to show
182 that it does. For example, Agostini (1922–23, p. 323) in his tribal
166 survey, records a section named Barsha as one of the groups stem-
613 ming from Nasr.[12] In the genealogies I was given, the name did not appear, and even after some questioning, what information was known about it was concealed. Some time later the name
[578] cropped up accidentally in conversation, and I was then told that at one time it had been one of the Nasr groups, but that after a quarrel during a year of water shortage, the Barsha folk went to live with people with whom they had maternal connexions, and in whose territory there was ample water that year, and never returned. The group, a tertiary one, was detached from the tertiary point of segmentation in the genealogies, and tied on to a tertiary group of another tribe in its new homeland.

178 To summarize briefly the argument thus far, the mechanical
173 devices of telescoping, fusion of names, the ejection of those
619 names which cease to be of any social consequence, and the
621 elision of names at or around the fifth ascending generation,
613 taken together point to the importance of the tertiary order of segmentation in discussing the problem of maintaining the form of the genealogy constant in face of its natural tendency to alter; further, evidence of changes (adoption into a lineage, detachment from it, the inclusion and exclusion of clients) was presented, and this again led to the conclusion that the tertiary point of segmentation is critical in this respect. This being so, the man-
[128] ner in which change actually occurs, still remains to be shown, and this is best done, perhaps, by discussing the mode of proliferation of tertiary segments. In order to do this adequately, it is necessary to say something briefly about certain features of Bedouin marriage.

582 Among the Bedouin there exists a preferential form of marriage
605 between a man and his father's brother's daughter. Parallel cousin marriage of this sort carries with it the exclusive right of a man to this cousin. Without his consent no one else can marry her, and to attempt to do so would be to risk the marriage arrangements being nullified after negotiations had almost been

[114] [12] Barsha's position is incorrectly given as a sub-group of Hasba; it should be shown as structurally equivalent to Hasba. See also note 11.

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the interests they have in their maternal relatives. Stated thus sharply, this is a distortion of the process. To speak of the principle of agnation conflicting with the principle of cognation or maternal origin is nonsense, as the facts included in the discussion show. Agnation is not one thing, but many. Within its scope are included such aspects of social organization as succession, status, inheritance, bride-wealth, blood-money, modes of domestic and political behaviour, and so forth; and each of these aspects, the closer we stick to reality, can be broken up into a number of components. The same can be said of cognation and maternal origin. All these principles, so called, are clusters of numerous component parts, which combine, in reality, in a kaleidoscopic number of ways. In one situation a component of one combines with that of another to strengthen it; in a different situation the one component may repel the other; in a third situation, a number of the components in one will combine to exclude those of the other, and so on. If, therefore, an understanding of the way in which lineage proliferation occurs is sought, a view of the process as a conflict between the principle of agnation and the opposing pull of maternal origin is quite erroneous. It is of use in predicting the direction of cleavage to know that within a tertiary group there are also clusters of kin which are defined roughly by maternal links, and this knowledge serves as a rough and ready guide in predicting what the composition of groups, after they have split away from the parent group, will be. If a more precise picture of this composition is desired, other and more complex kinship links and the behaviour which accompanies them must be taken into account. If a still more accurate picture is desired, details of inheritance disputes, debts of bride-wealth, the size of flocks and herds, and the like, must also be taken into consideration. If, finally, one has the opportunity to study groups after they have proliferated, the presence or absence of this or that man can often be explained only in terms of his eye for a pretty girl or a personal preference for neighbours.

The kind of change which has been discussed in this essay is not difficult to negotiate in genealogical terms. Earlier it was stressed that within the tertiary tribal sections, although they are always predominantly agnatic groups, clusters of cognatic

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613 602 121 178 621 173 551 kin also exist. Two ways of naming these clusters are adopted—all groups, whether they are elementary families, an odd assortment of kindred sharing a common tent for reasons of expediency, or tribal groups, have a name. Sometimes these clusters are named after a prominent living male, or a deceased kinsman of the same kind. Sometimes these little groups are named after a woman, perhaps the grandmother of the group.[15] Thus a small group of two or three tents will be distinguished from another similar cluster within the camp, and so on for a number of groups, depending on the size of the camp. Most camps, however many tents they contain, have names for progressively inclusive clusters of tents until a twofold named division is reached. Tertiary segments that are forced to split contain therefore two groups with names already attached to them. When a split occurs, the name of the tertiary segment is pushed into the area of ambiguity and the names of what were previously two clusters become the names of two new tertiary segments, with a minimum adjustment in usage and a minor re-shuffle at the tertiary level of segmentation. Names cannot continue to be pushed into this area of the genealogy interminably, otherwise it would gradually expand into a vast pool of names. For a few generations the name dispensed with in this way becomes one of those ancestors about whom there is argument when genealogies are given. In the course of time, name after name is subjected to the process of elision and eventually will cease to be of concern to anyone.

105 613 173 178 [551] I now summarize the main points of the discussion. The evidence that has been examined suggests that the mechanical devices of telescoping, fusion of names, and extinction of lines do not affect orders of segmentation superior to that of the tertiary order, and that in conditions of a completely stable population, these devices alone would suffice to retain the form of the genealogical structure. But, it was argued, conditions of complete stability cannot be assumed; the evidence of the present distribution of population among the numerous tertiary groups clearly points to marked fluctuations occurring within these small groups. This being so, proliferation of these groups in some areas at some

[15] The naming of groups within a tertiary segment is an interesting study in itself, but it would be outside the limits of this discussion to make more than a brief mention of it.

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times, must follow, and conversely, while proliferation takes place here, combination will be taking place elsewhere as the population of groups decreases. The condition which compels proliferation is the alteration in the relationship of man and animals to the natural resources; and when this alteration builds up to an acute pressure on water and land, one group of a divided segment must move off to seek water elsewhere.

The next task was to demonstrate where this kind of change occurred on the genealogy. The sudden irregularity in the number of segments at the tertiary order, compared with the uniformity at others, provided a clue. Other evidence also pointed to this as a significant order in this context: there is ambiguity displayed with regard to the identity and positioning of ancestors here; members adopted into a lineage are grafted on to it here; clients are attached to tertiary sections; groups of noblemen, when they are detached and move off to another tribe, break away at this point. This is where change occurs, but, it was agreed, in understanding the way in which it takes place, certain forms of marriage have to be taken into account. Particular emphasis was placed on cross-cousin marriage with the mother's brother's daughter, and to women outside the tertiary segment, since the effect of these forms of marriage is to produce two or more clusters of cognatic kindred in camps largely composed of agnates, and to emphasize the line of cleavage in a lineage segment. So that when, therefore, a split occurs, the line it takes is predetermined. Proliferation, even when necessary, does not finally come about, however, until an occasion permits the separation of groups to be demonstrated by a violation of the conditions of membership of a group. Details of three such occasions were offered: the demand for blood-money between agnates who previously had constituted a politically undivided section; behaviour contrary to the demands of agnatic kinship in attendance and gift-giving at funerals; and failure to participate in a pilgrimage to the saint's tomb of a particular section. But another query remained: how are the newly formed groups named? It was seen that names already in daily use by the small group of people concerned came to assume a new significance, while the name which had previously spanned them all is disregarded and pushed into the area of ambiguity whence later it is elided altogether.

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Change due to the normal and inevitable process of proliferation is thus managed within the structural limits of the tertiary section without disturbing any of the superior orders in the system. The latter remain fixed over long periods, but the tertiary sections of a particular secondary action may be reduced in number over a few generations while another secondary section may show a corresponding increase in the number of its segments.

By combining the various factors involved in change, it is possible to understand the details of lineage proliferation, or at least to travel along a well signposted road. In the light of this analysis, moreover, it is unnecessary to assume a stable population in each and every segment over long periods; the mechanisms of readjustment allow for substantial irregularities and fluctuations in population. It is possible that they are also sufficient to contain significant increases in the aggregate population. They could almost certainly control minor fluctuations, but it is seriously doubted whether a population increase sufficient to produce a country-wide and acute water shortage could be met merely by the proliferation of tertiary lineage segments. But to deal with this problem other aspects of the Bedouin genealogy and details of Cyrenaican history, which have necessarily been omitted from this discussion, would have to be taken into account, and this is best left for another article.

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THE SEDENTARIZATION OF NOMADS IN THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

A. M. Abou-Zeid

178 657 Much attention has been paid in the last few years, in both Egyptian and international circles, to the question of settling the nomads of the Western Desert of Egypt. A number of institutions (e.g. the Cairo Institute for Desert Research and the Departments of Sociology and Social Anthropology in the Egyptian universities) and some government departments (e.g. the Department of Desert Irrigation, of the Ministry of Public Works) have combined their efforts to study the economic and social situation of the semi-nomadic clans and the possibility of creating new sedentary agricultural communities to replace the present nomadic and semi-nomadic groups whose economy is based on the rearing of livestock in general, and of sheep in particular. It is the purpose of this paper to give a brief account of the main projects of sedentarization suggested by the authorities concerned in Egypt, and to outline their expected effects upon the economic system and modes of living, and also to indicate the repercussions they may eventually have on the whole social structure of the semi-nomadic clans. Apart from the planned projects, there is a marked and growing tendency among these people, especially the younger 178 generation, to abandon the traditional way of life and to settle down. This 166 tendency is generally stimulated by the changing social conditions. The tremendous hardships and the insecurity of the nomadic life, which is entirely dependent on rains, and the increasing social and cultural contacts with the urban communities in the Delta are the main factors influencing this change of social conditions, thus accentuating what may be described as a spontaneous and natural drift to settled life. Thus, an acute decline in the amount of rainfall, which is a frequent phenomenon in the Western Desert, and the consequent drought, famine and death of large numbers of animals will drive men to search for a more stable means of living in which they can find the security that is lacking in the nomadic way of life. The introduction of modern education and the establishment of schools in the larger villages have played a great role in changing the outlook of the people and in discrediting the traditional nomadic values. The advent of the railway and the improvement of other means of transport and communication have encouraged contacts with the Delta, and more particularly with Alexandria. As a result, an increasing number of young men migrate every year to Alexandria and get themselves paid jobs there. Trade and commercial transactions have also been increased with the Delta. New trade centres (e.g. El-Hammam, El-Dab'aa and Mersa Matrouh) have grown up along the railway line at the key stations. The most important of these centres is perhaps El-Hammam, which is the largest cattle market in the Western Desert. Small food stores and cafés and restaurants owned by 'native' people have been opened at these centres and in the larger

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villages and towns, especially at Mersa Matrouh which is the seat of the local government. The second world war was also influential in changing attitude and social values. Men who were employed as unskilled labourers during the war by the different combating armies became accustomed to paid jobs and to cash remuneration, which had previously been practically unknown to them. When the war ended, it was not easy for those workers to go back to the old nomadic life with all its hardships and insecurity. Some of them preferred to migrate to the Delta, while the others decided to settle down to work in the desert villages and towns as servants or as unskilled labour in the local government departments, schools, hospitals, etc. Most of the younger men now prefer to follow their example; the settled sedentary life is thus gaining ground all the time at the expense of livestock husbandry.

But important as they may be in accelerating the drift from nomadism to sedentary life, these factors fall beyond the scope of this paper and need not be discussed further in this context. We shall be concerned with the plans and schemes which are deliberately designed to deal with the settlement of the nomadic and semi-nomadic clans. But before going on to consider this problem we should like to give a brief outline of the area itself so as to establish a clear idea about the general setting, and to see the projects themselves against a background of the whole social life. This should help us to understand more clearly the motives underlying the projects and to discern the effects they may have on the social situation.

Geographers generally divide the Western Desert into three main divisions, each of which has its outstanding characteristics.

1. The northern strip which extends some 500 kilometres along the coast from the west of Alexandria to the Egyptian-Libyan border. This strip, known as the *Dera'a Bahari*, consists mainly of fertile cultivated land which extends some 20 to 30 kilometres to the south, tending generally to become narrower to the west till it almost vanishes at Sollum near the frontiers.
2. To the south of this green coastal zone lies a high plateau in which are a number of depressions, the most important being the Qattara Depression.
3. The rest of the area; i.e. the extreme southern region, is real arid desert.

The coastal zone is the only really inhabited and cultivated part of the desert; beyond it there is hardly any prospect for cultivation. It is also a vital centre to which the scattered clans and groups of herders come to gather round the water points and the artesian wells during the dry season when the water becomes scarce in the southern parts.

The climate of the desert varies between the Mediterranean climate to the north and along the coast, and the sub-tropical dry climate in the southern parts. The dry season is usually very warm, tending to grow hotter southwards; while the wet season, usually extending from November to March, is generally mild especially in the north. Rainfall is very erratic and varies greatly from year to year and from one place to another. But on the whole, there is more rain in the north than in the south, and in most years rain falls in the southern parts only on very rare occasions. Rain may come quite suddenly and cause torrential floods which sweep away dwellings, crops and animals alike. This is typical of the Sallum area.

According to the 1947 census, the Bedouins of the Western Desert number 68,161. Only 23,444, i.e. less than the half of the population, are engaged in

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bad years the returns may be so poor that grain and flour have to be sent from the Delta to avert famine. The failure of the crop may also compel whole clan-segments to migrate with their animals to the Delta. In this respect, the semi-nomadic clans of the Western Desert represent a real burden on the national economy of Egypt.

Livestock husbandry, which is by far the most important and highly valued occupation, is itself subject to the variability and the erratic nature of rainfall, since it is the rain which determines the abundance of herbage and, consequently, the number of animals reared. Pasture land is found mainly to the south of the cultivated land. Sometimes, the fallow patches among the barley fields are also covered with grass and other pasture plants suitable for grazing. Pasture plants usually persist between December and May; during the summer, the land becomes arid hard desert with only few dispersed patches of dry grass. The grazing season *par excellence* is from November to April, during which period barley stands in the fields. After the first showers of November, barley is sown and the young men soon move with their flocks to the pastures, leaving the older people to look after the fields. As the dry season advances, the flocks are moved northwards to the cultivated lands so as to be nearer to fodder and to water-holes. Thus, the movements of the herders are rhythmic and regulated by the division of the year into two major seasons: the wet season and the dry season. The wet season is the period of plenty during which the animals are well fed; the dry season is the period of starvation for the flocks which must then rely on such fodder as barley straw and on the drying grass. Any movements of animals that may take place during that season are carried out on a very limited scale. In exceptionally bad years the people are compelled to dispose of their animals, or at least of a large part of the flocks, or they may send them away to their friends and relatives who may be living near vegetation. Sometimes, the herdsmen find themselves compelled to cross the frontiers to Cyrenaica for pasture.

We can see then from this brief account to what extent the water situation is responsible for determining the modes of living in the desert and for channelling human activities and imposing certain limitations on these activities. Development projects and sedentarization schemes planned for the Western Desert and its inhabitants must, therefore, give a great deal of importance to the question of water and its availability. In fact, most of the contemplated projects envisage the possibility of better exploitation of the existing water supplies as well as the tapping of potential resources.

Rightly or wrongly, it is generally assumed in Egypt that nomadism and semi-nomadism represent a phase of deterioration which is no longer compatible with the actualities of modern life and therefore should be abolished. For, apart from the fact that it is responsible for the hardships and insecurity suffered by the desert dwellers and the consequent ill effects on the national economy, especially in bad years, nomadism as practised in the Western Desert and under the prevailing circumstances is wasteful and destructive. Vast stretches of land which could be reclaimed at little cost and cultivated intensively are simply left for grazing without any serious endeavour to make better use of them. Under the contemplated sedentarization projects it is intended to increase the cultivated area, to improve the pastures by introducing new pasture plants of higher nutritive value in areas where agriculture is not

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178 312 657 practicable, to tap unused resources, to develop the existing primitive crafts and to establish new industries. The question of water is the corner-stone of all these projects. Subterranean water has been tapped from the ancient Roman wells, and about 120 artesian wells have been sunk lately along the coast. A number of water cisterns have been constructed, and others are under construction, to preserve the rain-water for irrigation. Special attention has been paid in this regard to the western part of the coastal zone where the amount of rainfall exceeds that falling in the eastern parts. An example is the Wadi-el-Kharrouba cistern near Mersa Matrouh which will prevent large amounts of rain-water from being lost in the sands or in the sea, and store it for use during the dry season. All the water thus obtained will certainly help to extend the area sown with barley, especially in the El-Dab'aa zone; besides providing the more settled people with what they require to keep their fig trees and olive groves. The abundance of water may also encourage the introduction of new plants and trees which need a more stable and constant supply of water.

178 657 A few examples may serve to illustrate further the general policy adopted with regard to the problem of sedentarization of the Bedouin clans, and the steps taken to put the policy into effect.

The first example we shall consider is the Wadi-el-Natrun project which concerns the exploitation of the natural resources of the area so as to allow the establishement of new industries and the extension of the cultivated area, which in turn may eventually encourage the people to change to agriculture or industry, i.e. to a sedentary life. The *wadi* is an extended depression which lies some 22 metres below sea-level. The south-eastern end of the depression is 80 kilometres from Cairo, while the northern end is about 85 kilometres from Alexandria. A number of shallow salt lakes cover about half its total area, and some of these lakes become dry during the summer. The *wadi* is known as a rich source of salt and natron (sodium carbonate). Also a certain reed called *halfa* grows there and is used by the inhabitants of the area for the making of rough mats. The depression has always been regarded as a grazing ground for sheep and goats, so that only 25 *feddans*[1] were cultivated in 1952. According to the project, the extraction of salt and soda was put under government supervision. Subterranean water was tapped in a number of places and by the end of 1957 more than one thousand *feddans* were brought under the plough. Serious efforts were also made to introduce the cultivation of fruit, olives and dates as well as vegetables. Much attention was also given to the question of improving the production of animals by introducing different methods of breeding, and encouraging the inhabitants of the area to change over to the improved breeds which are superior to the local animals. This was met at first with much reluctance and resistance, but there are signs that the people are beginning to appreciate the benefit of owning the improved breeds. A factory for the manufacture of carpets and rugs has also been established by the government. A considerable proportion of the raw wool required for the industry is obtained from local sources, and the relatively small production finds a ready market in the larger cities of the Delta. The point of particular interest for us here is that all the unskilled labour employed in this industry as well as in the extraction of salt and sodium is recruited from the local population. Those workers have become accustomed to a settled life, so that when the season of extraction is over and work is temporarily suspended they do

1. A *feddan* = 1 038 acres.

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not take up herding animals but rather prefer to engage in agriculture, either as paid workers at the government research farm where fruit and vegetables are grown, or cultivating small patches of barley for their own consumption. Paid jobs in the factory or in the extraction industry and on the farm are very attractive to the young men. Fruit and vegetables are grown, for research purposes, in a large area of the reclaimed land. It is understood, however, that this land will be sold to the people to be exploited by them; and it is hoped that development of such farms will lead to the introduction of a canned food industry. Thus, the ultimate aim of the project is to encourage people to adopt a settled sedentary life by setting up new industries which depend mainly on the agricultural products of the area. The distribution of the arable lands will serve as an additional means of attaining this objective. All the lands of the desert are considered the exclusive property of the State, with only the right of usufruct conceded to the people. The people themselves know this only too well, although they may speak about 'their' fields and 'their' grazing-grounds and they are quite willing to settle down and to practise intensive agriculture if they are given the right to possess the land.

The main features of the Wadi-el-Natrun project repeat themselves in the Qattara Depression project which, besides its other objectives, is designed to bring about the sedentarization of the nomads by industrialization as well as by the enlarging of the cultivated area. The project is still under consideration; but from what is already known about it, it seems that the starting-point will be the digging of a long canal connecting the Mediterranean at the village of El-Alamein with the depression which lies 10 kilometres to the south of the coast. This step will be taken with the purpose of transforming a part of the depression into a large lake covering an area of about 14,000 square kilometres. The lowest point in the depression is 134 metres below sea-level; thus, it is expected that the sea water will rush towards the depression at some 600 cubic feet per second. The force of the rushing water could be used as motive power for factories in the area and as a means of generating the electric power necessary for industries to be established. As in the case of the Wadi-el-Natrun project, all the labour needed for these industries will be recruited locally. In addition, the creation of this vast artificial lake will temper the heat of the area and it is expected that as a result of the perpetual evaporation from the lake large amounts of rain will fall there, thus making possible the cultivation of vast stretches of land. It will certainly take a very long time for the lake to be completely filled up with sea-water. Experts estimate, for example, that it will need about 40 years for the water-level to reach 70 metres below sea-level, and about 150 years for it to reach 50 metres below sea-level. Some 1,300 years should pass before the depression itself is entirely filled up with salt deposits as a result of evaporation.

Lastly, the Ras-el-Hikma project endeavours to deal with the same problem but from a different angle. Unlike the Wadi-el-Natrun and the Qattara Depression projects which are concerned with industrialization and increasing the cultivated lands as means of encouraging sedentarization, the Ras-el-Hikma project is designed, to achieve that end by improving the grazing potentialities of the Western Desert in general and the Fuka-Ras-el-Hikma region in particular; and also by rationalizing the use of pasture-grounds. The logic that lies behind the project is as follows: The excessive misuse of the pasture plants and uncontrolled grazing in the desert have caused aridity and consequently obliged the people to adopt a nomadic life in search of

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pasture. Therefore, if pasture grasses could be developed and grazing practices could be organized, it would then be easy to bring the herders to a form of sedentary life in which they could practise animal husbandry in certain specific areas all the year round, without any need for transhumance or for seasonal migrations or movements. It is thought that the long-term results of the project will be both an increase in livestock production and a greater interest in the land and in intensive agriculture—a feature which hardly exists among the nomads. Ras-el-Hikma, a small village on the coast mid-way between Alexandria and Sollum, has been chosen as a suitable place for a pilot project. A research station has been established there and the whole project has been placed under the sponsorship of the Desert Institute of Cairo.

An area of about 7500 *feddans* was selected and fenced round for the pilot project. Intensive research has been carried out to develop species of palatable pasture grass which can stand the drought and summer heat and other local conditions. Considerable areas have been resown and kept under close observation. Selected breeds of animals have been imported and placed under observation both for the study of grazing management and in order to determine to what extent these breeds can be used in improving the local breeds. Much attention has been given to the problem of developing the underground water supplies; a number of wells have been sunk and wind-pumps have been erected on some of them. Efforts have also been made to introduce the cultivation of fruits and vegetables and to encourage the local inhabitants to adopt them as part of their normal diet.

So much for the development of the natural resources and grazing management in the area. But if the Bedouins are to settle down and make best use of these improved conditions, they should also be provided with suitable housing for new type of existence. A section of the land put aside for the pilot project was divided into plots on each of which was built a 'model' house designed to meet all the requirements of the Bedouin in his new life. Each dwelling has its own small garden where vegetables and fruit can be grown for private consumption, and its own animal byre. Wells provided with wind-pumps have also been constructed to provide the settlers with water for daily use and for the irrigation of their gardens.

From the purely technical point of view, the pilot project has shown good and encouraging results; and there is every reason to believe that the main project will be equally successful if it is handled with the same determination and seriousness. But it may be too early to give any definite opinion about the sociological results that can be expected. The people have not yet shown any real interest in what is going on around them, in spite of the laborious and continuous efforts made by the staff of the research station to stimulate this interest.

From these examples, two main points may be singled out for special notice:

1. Most of the projects tend to encourage sedentarization at the expense of animal husbandry; or at least they do not give enough consideration to this vital question. The only exception to this is, perhaps the Ras-el-Hikma project. This policy may prove, in the end, to be harmful to livestock production and may have the effect of depleting the animal wealth of the region. Industrialization and the agricultural development of the arable areas in the desert, important as they may be as means of bringing about sedentarization, should not divert interest from long-range development schemes.

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2. It may prove impossible for all the claims put forward for the sedentarization projects to be be fulfilled unless the people are entitled to own the lands they cultivate. Besides giving the inhabitants a new feeling of security, this would attach them permanently to their fields, and thus incite them to give due attention to cultivation. Land-holding is considered to be the determining factor in the process of establishing sedentary life in the desert. 178• 657

Reactions to the proposed sedentarization projects vary widely, from indifference, reluctance and resentment to the absolute acceptance of them together with the changes which they may be expected to bring about. The kind of reaction depends mainly on the benefits that may be gained, or the losses that may be suffered, as a result of the realization of these projects. Thus, the semi-nomads who usually spend a considerable part of the year near towns and the larger villages such as Mersa Matrouh and El-Dab'aa and who thus have some idea of the significance and the privileges of settled life react favourably in general and welcome the sedentarization projects. Similar reactions may be found among the groups who have been accustomed to wage labour and who have thus tasted the advantages which money can offer. On the other hand, the more nomadic clans, especially those inhabiting the southern and the western parts of the desert, are forthright in expressing their deep resentment and indignation concerning the new projects. This is more obvious among the nomadic groups which live near the Egyptian-Libyan borders and who thus have grazing interests in Cyrenaica as well. For them sedentarization means the loss of these interests. Tribal chiefs also express dismay at the projects and the impending changes. Their doubts and resentment spring from their fear of losing their authority over the tribesmen, if the clans and the nomadic groups are sedentarizated and thus brought under the control of the local administration. 178

There is no doubt that the realization of these projects will cut deep into the structure of the traditional Bedouin community. The creation of new industrial and trade centres, the drift to agriculture and industry and to paid jobs, the increase in contacts with the Delta and especially with Alexandria, the greater amounts of cash in the hands of the people as a result of all these developments, and lastly the emergence of individual or private ownership of land as a result of new land legislation will lead to a growing sense of individuality and of economic independence among the younger generation. These individualistic tendencies may have some disruptive effects on both the traditional patterns of social relationships and the total social structure. Being economically independent of the lineage or the larger kin-groups, the young men will be able to free themselves from the authority of their elders, which may lead in the end to the breaking down of the whole traditional structure.

Perhaps the system which will be affected more deeply by these new trends is the kinship system, around which revolves all social and political life in the desert. The core of this system is the co-operation of a large number of agnatic kin constituting one corporate economic unit in which the personality of the individual is entirely submerged by group interests. The economic independence of the individual members and the consequent trend towards separation will lead to the shrinkage of this kin-group and to the disappearance of lineages and larger lineage-segments. Thus, the corporate units based on kinship relations will be limited in size and most of them will take the form of the

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178 elementary family which prevails in the larger cities and the urban communities in general. In fact this type of family is already beginning to dominate the scene in the larger villages of the desert, such as Mersa Matrouh, which offer opportunities for trade and paid employment.

The traditional political system will also suffer badly, and it seems that the fears of the tribal chiefs are fully justified. Besides being affected by subjection to the local administrative authorities after sedentarization, the prestige of the chiefs will be equally depreciated by the antipathy of the people themselves to their intervention in their affairs. This antipathy can be noted among the more settled groups (in Mersa Matrouh, El-Dab'aa, El-Amriya, etc.) who tend to ignore the authority of the chiefs. Thus, it should be expected that the absolute coercive powers enjoyed by the chiefs of the more nomadic groups will be largely diminished by sedentarization and reduced to ineffectiveness. Yet the curb which will be imposed on the authority of the chiefs will provide, on the other hand, an effective means for social control in the desert. Under the present tribal organization, chiefs are liable to misuse their authority and can be a real source of unrest and trouble, by organizing raids against rival and hostile clans, smuggling goods across the Egyptian-Libyan frontiers, giving refuge and protection to criminals and helping them to cross the borders and escape punishment, etc. Sedentarization will put an end to these illegal activities.

In fact, the social achievements of the projects will be by no means less important than the economic results, although they were not envisaged at first by the authorities or, at least, were not given explicit consideration in the original plans. The importance of the sociological aspects of the projects can be judged from the fact that their effects will not be confined to the local Bedouin communities, but will rather influence Egyptian society at large. The emergence of the new mode of life depending mainly on intensive agriculture and on industry will encourage immigration from the Nile Valley. Some of the proposed projects do actually consider the possibility of moving 'active' and more trained peasantry elements from the Delta to rehabilitate the desert and more particularly the coastal zone and to cultivate the reclaimed lands. There is no doubt, also, that all the skilled labour needed for the new industries will be brought from Alexandria and other cities of the Nile Valley. Thus, the creation of new industrial and commercial centres in the desert will absorb a certain proportion of the inhabitants of the Delta. This can be regarded as a good contribution towards solving the problem of the increasing population of Egypt. But the crowning achievement of these projects will be the reduction of the cultural and social contrast which exists at present between the Western Desert, with its nomadic and semi-nomadic inhabitants, and the rest of the country. This contrast is manifested in the different patterns of social relationships, the different values and modes of thought, and the different structure prevailing in the desert and the Nile Valley. The creation of settled agricultural and industrial communities in the desert, the increase of contacts between the desert and the Delta, mass immigration into the desert and the breaking down of the traditional tribal organization will all help to bridge the existing social gulf. In other words, the realization of the sedentarization projects will lead in the end to a fuller social cohesion not only among the different Bedouin groups but also between the desert as a whole and the rest of the country.

9: Murray E.K-3,4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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Had the Senussi been successful in the last war, they would no doubt have brought in the 'Ibeidat or the 'Awaqir from Cyrenaica to replace the Awlad 'Ali in Egypt.

At the present day the Awlad 'Ali, especially the eastern sections near the Nile Valley, have almost ceased to be nomadic, and only the old men have memories of their former warlike habits. They suffered considerably during the Great War, but are again becoming prosperous. They now own large comfortable tents, are beginning to build houses and clear out cisterns, and are also said to be increasing in numbers.[1] So civilized have they grown that my guides, one a Sinai Arab and the other an 'Abadi, concurred in calling them "green"—not real desert-worthy Bedouins.

Perhaps as a result of Libyan influence, or more probably the better nurture and climate, they are taller, heavier, stronger, and lighter-complexioned than the lightly built Arabs of Sinai and Hijaz. Also they are much franker and more straightforward than their shifty and suspicious eastern cousins, and altogether more trustworthy. Their women only veil themselves to strangers, and talk quite naturally and cheerfully to the men of their own tribe.

They cultivate as much barley as they can, using a primitive plough drawn by camels, in the clayey hollows scattered over their very stony limestone desert, but, as the rainfall is very uncertain, a good crop only occurs every five or six years. After harvest, they exchange some of their barley for maize, which the women grind to make bread as required, and some for dried dates. The seed for next year is buried in a hole lined with straw and covered with clay, and a year's forage for the animals is set aside. The rest of the crop goes to market, and for a short time the Arab has money to buy clothes for himself and his family and at utmost need to pay off some of the numerous debts he has inherited from his forefathers. Soon he is reduced again to the clothes he wears, the tent he sleeps in, and his animals grazing in the desert.

They are great breeders of camels and sheep, and a busy traffic in these goes on weekly in the markets of Hammam, 'Amriya, and the Beheira. So they have got into the habit

[1] At the 1927 census, the Western Desert Arabs, Awlad 'Ali, Jawabis, etc., numbered 38,928 souls exclusive of those settled in Beheira. But Pacho, 100 years ago, estimated them at 38,000 souls.

9: Murray E.K-3,4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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436 of thinking in money, and they reckon blood-money in cash
178 (£300) and not in camels, as Bedouin should.

The more adventurous make, annually, long and waterless
484 journeys to the oases of Siwa and Bahariya to remove the date
245 crop, and, after their own wants are provided for, a good profit usually results from the sale of the remainder.

181 An Egyptian critic, who should know them only too well,[1] calls them "haughty, independent, and untrustworthy in character. They are dull and so abnormally lazy that they have no desire whatever to do more than they learnt (when young)". But he puts this down to the nature of the country; less generous critics ascribe the nature of the country to them!

173 Besides the descendants from 'Ali's three sons, 'Ali el-
619 Abyad, 'Ali el-Ahmar, and Sineina, a large section called Sinaqra reckons its descent from Sinqir, a mysterious white man who was wrecked and washed up on the coast near Salum some time in the seventeenth century.[2] These are the true Awlad 'Ali, whose sections live mingled together in the most intricate fashion. Among them live also the Jumei'at, who invited them into the country, and various families of other *murabitin*, such as Qat'an, Awlad Suleiman, Hawara, Habun, etc.
619 To distinguish themselves from their vassals, the Awlad 'Ali call themselves *hurr* free, and the *murabitin* are divided into various grades, according as they pay tribute or not.

The Awlad 'Ali are divided into three main divisions, with section (*badanat*) and subsections (*'eilat*) as follows. Some of these are so numerous that they practically constitute fresh tribes of their own.

I. Awlad Kharuf

[193] These are the descendants of 'Ali el-Abyad ("The White"), the eldest son of 'Ali bin 'Aqar bin Dib, and are subdivided again into:

	Section.	*Subsections.*
(1)	'Eilet Bu Hindi	'Eilet Bu Zayyana, 'Eilet Bahiya, 'Eilet Da'ud
(2)	'Eilet Bu Diya	'Eilet Ibrahim, 'Eilet Jereisat
(3)	Awlad Mansur	El-Afrad, El-Tawa'il, 'Eilet 'Abd Allah

[1] Muhammad Bey Wasfi, for many years Inspector at Borg el-'Arab.
[2] Their sheikh told Hamilton in 1853, there were seven generations between him and Sinqir.